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ITRODUCTIO 
 
The increased number of Somali pirates’ attacks against ships off the coast of Somalia and 
in the Gulf of Aden in recent years has attracted special attention of the international 
community. Although the menace of piracy was believed to have largely disappeared in 
modern times, piracy remains a considerable threat to international maritime trade. On an 
almost daily basis the maritime community is confronted with new reports of piratical 
attacks, most frequently off the Somali coast. 
On 16 November 2009, for instance, the Piracy Reporting Centre of the 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported: 
 
16.11.2009, 10:53 UTC, Position: 08:0.11S – 045:58E, around 600 nm southeast of 
Mogadishu, Somalia: 
Pirates armed with machine guns attacked, boarded and hijacked a chemical 
tanker underway. They took hostage 28 crew members. The pirates are in control of 
the tanker and are sailing her to an unknown destination.
1
 
 
Despite such frequently occurring piratical attacks against commercial vessels, 
maritime trade still passes through the narrow strait between the Horn of Africa and the 
Arabian peninsula, as alternative routes, for instance around the Cape of Good Hope, 
would cause excessive costs. 
 
This paper will focus on how to combat piracy in these days, both from a general 
perspective and, whenever appropriate, specifically with regard to the serious situation off 
the coast of Somalia. 
Chapter 1 will deal with the development of piracy, outlining its historical origins 
as well as pointing out current incidents of piracy in various regions, different types of 
piracy, general explanation attempts for the increase in piratical acts and the specific 
situation off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. In Chapter 2 the relationship 
between piracy and maritime terrorism will be clarified as both of these terms are more and 
more frequently used interchangeably without sticking to basic features of either piracy or 
terrorism anymore. Chapter 3 will form the centrepiece of the paper examining the existing 
international legal framework against piracy. Beginning with piracy’s origins in customary 
                                                           
1 See incident details at the International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre website: http://www.icc-
ccs.org/index.php?option=com_fabrik&c=form&view=details&Itemid=82&fabrik=48&rowid=365&tableid=
70&fabrik_cursor=0&fabrik_total=0 [Accessed 17.11.2009]. 
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international law, the major international conventions to prevent and combat piracy will be 
analysed, always especially focusing on the definitions of offences as well as rights and 
obligations under the respective convention. Moreover, the United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions on Somalia will be outlined. In Chapter 4 the focus will be on 
international cooperation to combat piracy, distinguishing cooperation carried out by 
private companies and organisations as opposed to cooperation under the umbrella of 
countries and government-based international organisations. Respecting the latter type of 
international cooperation a further distinction will be made between cooperation on an 
international level and cooperation on a regional level. Chapter 5 will deal with matters of 
self-defence on board in the case of an incident as well as the employment of private armed 
guards on board merchant vessels and private armed escort vessels. In Chapter 6 the author 
will conclude with a summary and give some final remarks with regard to prospective 
developments. 
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CHAPTER 1: The Development of Piracy 
 
I. Historical Origins of Piracy 
The origins of piracy date back hundreds if not thousands of years when seafaring became 
a common practice of states and in particular when maritime commerce between states 
began to develop.2 An inscription on an Egyptian clay tablet from the 14th century B.C. 
probably provides one of the earliest indications of ancient piracy, describing in detail how 
attacks of pirates occurred off the coast of Egypt.3 
 
Although piracy is universally condemned in modern times, to come to the 
conclusion that piracy was always disdained would be wrong. In the early first century 
B.C. for instance, pirates in the Mediterranean Sea were at least temporarily condoned to a 
large extent because they supplied the Roman Empire with numerous slaves for its luxury 
markets.4 But it is not necessary to look back that far into the past: in the 17th century the 
rival European powers of the time such as the British Empire or the Spanish Empire 
commissioned pirates by issuing letters of marque and used these so-called privateers for 
harassing and attacking their enemies’ merchant vessels.5 Pirates were regarded ‘as a 
weapon in the arsenal of states’6 and piracy proved as an ideal way to strike one’s enemy 
without bringing about a state of war between states.7 
 
However, the status of pirates fluctuated considerably as piracy was ostracised in 
times of relative peace although it was supported by states when they were at war with 
enemy states. Therefore decommissioned privateers became frustrated and started 
attacking any vessel without distinction of different states.8 It is argued that this was the 
starting point from which pirates became hostes humani generis, i.e. enemies of mankind 
and of civilisation itself.9  
Notwithstanding this development quite a long time passed until the European 
                                                           
2 DR Burgess ‘Hostis Humani Generi: Piracy, Terrorism and a New International Law’ (2006) 13 U. Miami 
Int’l & Comp. L. Rev 293 at 301. 
3 R Fowler ‘Pirates of the Mediterranean – Pillaging and Plundering in Ancient Times’ (21.05.2007), 
available at http://ancient-culture.suite101.com/article.cfm/pirates_of_the_mediterranean [Accessed 
26.11.2009]. 
4 JD Peppetti ‘Building the Global Maritime Security Network: A Multinational Legal Structure to Combat 
Transnational Threats’ (2008) 55 4aval L. Rev. 73 at 87. 
5 M Bahar ‘Attaining Optima Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategic Theory for Naval Anti-Piracy 
Operations’ (2007) 40 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1 at 12. 
6 L Azubuike ‘International Law Regime against Piracy’ (2009) 15 Ann. Surv. Int’l & Comp. L. 43 at 45. 
7 AP Rubin The Law of Piracy 2nd (1998) at 31.  
8 Burgess (note 2) at 307-8. 
9 Azubuike (note 6) at 46. 
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maritime states abolished all forms of piracy, the practice of privateering and government 
sponsorship with the Declaration of Paris in 1856.10 However, the first basis for a legal 
framework in order to define and combat piracy was not established before the middle of 
the 20th century, as will be outlined below (see p. 16). 
 
II. Modern-day Piracy 
1. Overview of Current Incidents 
Even nowadays piracy at sea remains a serious threat to maritime commerce. From a 
global point of view the hot spots of piracy are in Southeast Asia, in parts of South and 
Central America and in the Caribbean waters, along some African coast lines and in the 
Gulf of Aden.11 The developments of these various regions during the last few years show 
considerable differences. 
 
In Southeast Asia, particularly in the Strait of Malacca between the Malaysian 
peninsula and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, which had been the most endangered area 
in a global comparison for a significant period of time, the number of attacks per year has 
halved between 2005 and 2008 from 82 to 41 attacks, and it is estimated that this number 
will decrease even more in 2009. 
 
In the same timeframe the frequency of attacks in South and Central America as 
well as in the Caribbean waters remained on a relatively low level counting not more than 
21 annual attacks in total although currently a slight increase to already 28 attacks within 
the first three quarters of 2009 is worth to be mentioned. 
 
With regard to the African coasts, the situations in endangered areas are 
significantly different. In the hot spot of Nigeria the number of incidents has stabilised 
between 14 and 26 within the period of 2005 and 2008 whereas in the region off the coast 
of Somalia together with the Gulf of Aden a tremendous increase from 27 attacks in total 
in 2005 to 63 attacks in 2008 was recorded. For 2009 the figures are even worse: from a 
worldwide total of 306 attacks reported in the period January to September 147 attacks 
took place off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden respectively, i.e. almost every 
                                                           
10 See the text of the Declaration of Paris (1856) at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/decparis.asp 
[Accessed 26.11.2009]. 
11 With regard to these areas the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre issues specific warnings to mariners to be 
extra cautious and to take necessary precautionary measures when transiting; see http://www.icc-
ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=70&Itemid=58 [Accessed 26.11.2009]. 
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second attack was conducted in that region.12 
 
Looking at these figures of the latest quarterly Piracy Report of the IMB one has to 
bear in mind though that the actual number of attacks is very likely to be even higher as 
many shipowners and masters are very reluctant to report such incidents (e.g. in order to 
avoid a rise of insurance premiums).13 
 
2. Different Types of Piracy 
Concerning piratical acts, various types of attacks in terms of different levels of 
sophistication in planning and violence in execution as well as the frequency in which they 
occur have to be distinguished. For a better understanding four different types of piracy are 
to be pointed out.14 
 
The most frequently occurring but also least violent and less sophisticated types of 
attacks can be characterised as so-called subsistence piracy, i.e. theft of comparatively low 
cost items while the vessel is at anchor or berthed in the pier. The perpetrators are often 
unemployed fishermen searching for portable ship supplies which can quickly be 
converted into cash without any problems. 
 
A different type of incident takes place while the vessel is underway. The pirates 
either board the vessel clandestinely looking for any portable and readily accessible goods, 
equipment and valuables or they make a violent attack not hesitating to use force against 
the ship’s crew in order to obtain all cash on board as well as other valuables which are 
more difficult to access. In particular the latter type obviously entails a much higher risk of 
getting hurt for the ship’s crew but also requires a higher level of sophistication if the 
perpetrators want to be successful. 
 
Another type of piracy which has probably attracted the most attention of the 
international maritime community in recent years is the kidnapping for ransom of a ship’s 
                                                           
12 All figures refer to the IMB Piracy Report for the period 1 January - 30 September 2009, available at 
http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_fabrik&view=form&fabrik=18&random=0&Itemid=92 
[Accessed 24.11.2009]. 
13 EC Stiles ‘Reforming Current International Law to Combat Modern Sea Piracy’ (2004) 27 Suffolk 
Transnat’l L. Rev. 299 at 300. 
14 In the following the author basically refers to the distinction made by M Mejia & PK Mukherjee ‘The SUA 
Convention 2005: A Critical Evaluation of its Effectiveness in Suppressing Maritime Criminal Acts’ (2006) 
12(3) JIML 170 at 171-2. 
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crew. Although these incidents occur less frequently than the above-mentioned ones, the 
risks for life and limb of the ship’s crew are potentially high in view of the fact that these 
perpetrators are usually heavily armed (e.g. with AK-47s) and well prepared when they 
attack a vessel. As will be shown below this type of piracy is also the prevalent one off the 
coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. 
 
Finally, a less frequently occurring but highly sophisticated and violent type of 
piracy is the hijacking of vessels. Pirates are not interested in cash or easily transportable 
items but rather in the vessel and all of its cargo itself. While the cargo is sold on the black 
market the vessel itself is repainted, renamed and equipped with fake registration papers 
and serves as a so-called ‘phantom ship’ for the pirates’ own purposes such as committing 
cargo frauds. The effort it takes to plan and execute such an attack gives rise to assume that 
these highly sophisticated attacks are conducted by organised international crime 
syndicates.15 
 
These remarks show that piratical attacks can be subject to totally different 
intentions of their perpetrators, ranging from subsistence piracy to well-organised crime 
syndicates with entirely different expectations of ‘incomes’.16 
 
The interest of the international community in improving cooperation to prevent 
and combat piracy incidents in the above-mentioned hot spots depends essentially on their 
level of seriousness. Relevant parameters in this regard are the types of weapons employed 
in these incidents, the treatment of the ship’s crew, the value of property stolen and the 
level of threat to safety of maritime navigation.17 
 
3. General Explanation Attempts for the Increase in Acts of Piracy 
On the one hand the different regions in which piracy occurs quite often share a number of 
similar problems but on the other hand each region also suffers from specific individual 
circumstances. In the following the author outlines conceivable reasons which may account 
for the surge of piratical attacks in these days. 
 
                                                           
15 GD Gabel ‘Smoother Seas Ahead: The Draft Guidelines as an International Solution to Modern-day 
Piracy’ (2007) 81 Tul. L. Rev. 1433 at 1436. 
16 See J Xu ‘Piracy as a Maritime Offence: Some Public Policy Considerations’ (2007) J.B.L. 639 at 647. 
17 RC Beckman ‘Combatting [sic] Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Southeast Asia: The Way 
Forward’ (2002) 33 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 317 at 320-1. 
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In view of the fact that nowadays maritime commerce constitutes about ninety per 
cent of world trade,18 which, however, can only be conducted through a restricted number 
of maritime channels, it becomes apparent that this situation provides many potential 
targets for piratical attacks.19 Many shipowners and masters have no choice but to send 
their vessels through narrow straits such as between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian 
peninsula or the Strait of Malacca where unarmed cargo vessels become ‘easy prey’ for 
pirates.20 Additionally, it is not only impossible to protect the vast oceans completely from 
piracy,21 but also are many littoral states in endangered regions simply not able to police 
their own waters.22 
 
Apart from the inability of some states one has to keep in mind that some 
governments may not have sufficient incentives to enforce the law. As long as the social 
costs of piracy which a coastal state faces are comparatively low it may be very reluctant to 
take usually quite costly anti-piracy measures, not to mention the fact that in some regions 
‘piracy may even be thought of  as a way to bring prosperity to local coastal societies’.23 
Moreover, the problem of corruption should not be forgotten. It is argued that ‘it would be 
naive to believe that there is not collusion between criminals and law enforcers in most 
jurisdictions’ which are affected.24 
Even if affected states are willing to take anti-piracy measures because their 
national economies may rely on sea shipping to a large extent, they face the problem that 
the long-term damage caused by piracy is ‘not as easily identifiable as the immediate 
financial burden placed upon the public if an expensive piracy control system is 
established’.25 In addition, such expenditures are often hard to justify by a government 
against a frequently predominantly poor population which may only see the immediate 
benefit for mostly foreign shipowners but not the long-term benefit for the society of that 
country.26 
 
Another explanation attempt is related to the circumstance that maritime commerce 
                                                           
18 BH Dubner ‘Recent Developments in the International Law of the Sea’ (1999) 33 Int’l Law. 627 at 632. 
19 Gabel (note 15) at 1439. 
20 E Kontorovich ‘International Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia’ (2009) 13(2) ASIL 
Insights, available at http://www.asil.org/insights090206.cfm [Accessed 28.11.2009]. 
21 W Langewiesche The Outlaw Sea: A World of Freedom, Chaos, and Crime (2004) at 7. 
22 Stiles (note 13) at 301. 
23 Xu (note 16) at 651. 
24 Ibid at 651-2. 
25 J Mo ‘Options to Combat Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia’ (2002) 33 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 343 at 351. 
26 Ibid. 
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frequently ‘passes through a global geography of poverty, envy and desperation’, thus 
valuable goods transported by cargo vessels offer a welcome opportunity for pirates as 
they are ‘all easily black-marketed into quick money’.27 Furthermore, it is argued that these 
vessels loaded with precious cargo are ‘crewed from pools of poor’ who will never be able 
to have access to the wealth that they see and transport every single day.28  
 
Lastly, two rather practical issues are worth to be mentioned. Firstly, concerning 
piratical attacks with kidnapping for ransom of a ship’s crew it was firmly criticised that 
the payment of ransom could be regarded as an encouragement to further hostage-taking in 
the future.29 Secondly, the increase of flag of convenience states has contributed to the 
surge of phantom ships.30 The problem is not only that open registers have enabled vessels 
to claim nationality of a state with which the vessel has few or no connections, but also that 
the procedure of how vessels can be registered in flag of convenience states often without 
any inspections of the vessels is too easy.31 This facilitates the reregistration of hijacked 
vessels. 
 
4. The Specific Situation of Piracy around the Horn of Africa 
(a) Historical Background: Somalia’s Development to a ‘Failed State’ 
In 1960 a former British and an Italian protectorate, namely British and Italian Somaliland, 
became independent and joined in a united Somali Republic, more commonly known as 
Somalia.32 In October 1969 the Somali President was assassinated and a few days later, the 
army under Major General Mohamed Siad Barre took power. By the end of December 
1990 however, the capital Mogadishu was shaken by severe fighting and many parts of the 
country were not under control of any authority anymore. In January 1991 Siad Barre was 
ousted by combined northern and southern clan-based forces, which were backed and 
armed by Ethiopia, and the Somali state collapsed. It was the beginning of a long-lasting 
                                                           
27 J Hitt ‘Bandits in the Global Shipping Lanes’ (20.08.2000) The 4ew York Times, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/20/magazine/bandits-in-the-global-shipping-lanes.html?pagewanted=all 
[Accessed 28.11.2009]. 
28 Langewiesche (note 21) at 3-4. 
29 UK Foreign Secretary cited at http://www.incelaw.com/publications/index.asp?id=1055,1006,43,1012 
[Accessed 19.08.2009]. 
30 Gabel (note 15) at 1439. 
31 T Garmon ‘International Law of the Sea: Reconciling the Law of Piracy and Terrorism in the Wake of 
September 11th’ (2002) 27 Tul. Mar. L. J. 257 at 267-8. 
32 All the following remarks refer to the Final Report of the International Expert Group on Piracy off the 
Somali Coast (p. 10-12), workshop commissioned by the Special Representative of the Secretary General the 
United Nations to Somalia, Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Nairobi, 10 - 21 November 2008; 
available at http://www.imcsnet.org/imcs/docs/somalia_piracy_intl_experts_report_consolidated.pdf 
[Accessed 28.11.2009]. 
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civil war in Somalia as no armed fraction was in the position to offer a national solution. 
Thus, fighting continued in many parts of the country for several years. 
 
However, already in May 1991 the north-western region of Somalia declared its 
independence as Somaliland. Later in 1998 local authorities established the semi-
autonomous region of Puntland in the north-eastern region of the country and in April 2002 
local leaders based in Baidoa proclaimed the formation of a State of Somalia in the south-
western region. 
 
Although the so-called Transnational Federal Government (TFG) was established 
in 2004 there is still no effective central national government which controls the whole 
country. Currently three different administrations have to be distinguished: (1) the TFG 
which intends to be the national government although it still has not managed to establish 
itself entirely in Mogadishu, (2) the government of Somaliland which aims to be the 
government of an independent Somaliland, and (3) the government of Puntland which 
seeks to be the government of the semi-autonomous region of Puntland. The basic 
shortcomings all the administrations struggle with are inadequacies with regard to 
governance systems, human resources, delivery of public services and physical 
infrastructure. 
 
(b) Incidents Attributed to Somali Pirates in These Days 
The number of incidents carried out by suspected Somali pirates has to be taken very 
seriously. In the period between January and September 2009 a total of 168 piratical 
attacks attributed to Somali pirates occurred in various geographical locations off the coast 
of Somalia, including parts of the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, southern parts of the 
Red Sea, waters off the east coast of Oman and parts of the Arabian Sea. A total of 32 
vessels were reported hijacked and 533 crew members were taken hostage. Furthermore, 
eight crew members were injured, four killed and one reported missing. It is striking that 
100 of these incidents took place in the Gulf of Aden and 47 off the Somali east and south 
coast. The attacks were conducted against bulk carriers, containers, fishing vessels, RoRos, 
tankers, tugs and yachts. 
 
In its latest quarterly Piracy Report, the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre states that 
most likely due to ‘the increased number of warships patrolling the Gulf of Aden and with 
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ship’s masters adhering to the recommended advice and deploying effective anti-piracy 
precautionary measures, the number of successful hijackings in the Gulf of Aden has 
dropped dramatically. However, the attacks are continuing with serious concerns … [and 
as] the monsoon recedes in September 2009, pirates are expected to start attacking vessels 
once again at full force … [because with] the end of the monsoon period, the wind and 
weather conditions are favourable to the pirates’.33 According to these concerns it was 
reported that major shippers such as Mærsk, one of the world’s largest, have seriously 
considered ‘forgoing the Suez Canal and routing ships around the Cape of Good Hope in 
order to avoid piracy-prone Somalia’.34 
 
Furthermore, the Somali pirates’ modus operandi has changed from the beginning 
in the mid 1990s to now. Initially pirates did not use very large skiffs powered by outboard 
motors because on the one hand they were quite dependent on favourable weather 
conditions and on the other hand not able to attack vessels far off the coast. Nowadays, 
pirates usually use considerably more powerful speedboats and in several cases they are 
believed to use additional ‘mother ships’ which can move inconspicuously into the ocean 
carrying pirates, weapons and skiffs. When having targeted and almost reached a particular 
vessel the mother ship launches smaller skiffs to attack and hijack the passing vessels at 
very far distance from the coast. Therefore, the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre advises that 
vessels should keep as far away as possible from the coastline, preferably more than 600 
nautical miles.35 The skiffs often attack from a number of directions simultaneously in 
order to allow at least one of the skiffs to approach a vessel unnoticed and enable a number 
of pirates to board the vessel. The pirates themselves are usually heavily armed with AK-
47s for instance and rocket-propelled grenades.36 
 
Lastly, it is noteworthy that in comparison to piracy hot spots in other parts of the 
world, such as the Strait of Malacca, Somalia does not have the natural coastal terrain 
required by pirates in order to hide attacked ships from aerial and maritime surveillance. 
However, there is simply no need for this type of terrain because Somali pirates are usually 
not interested in the cargo or the vessel itself but they only pursue one particular goal, 
                                                           
33 All figures in this paragraph in respect of attacks by Somali pirates refer to the IMB Piracy Report for the 
period 1 January - 30 September 2009 (note 12), see in particular p. 23. 
34 J Kraska & B Wilson ‘Piracy Repression, Partnering and the Law’ (2009) 40 J. Mar. L. & Com. 43 at 46. 
35 See the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre’s warning for piracy prone areas, available at http://www.icc-
ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=70&Itemid=58 [Accessed 30.11.2009]. 
36 See the Final Report of the International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast (note 32), p. 14-19. 
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namely ransom for hostages. In 2008 the average ransom was estimated between 
US$ 500,000 to US$ 2 million and the estimated income from piracy for 2008 in total was 
projected to be between US$ 18 to 30 million.37 
 
(c) Specific Problems in Somalia 
The current situation of flourishing piracy off the coast of Somalia and the increasing 
number of piratical attacks since the mid 1990s is due to different factors which can be 
distinguished as internal and external ones. 
 
With regard to internal factors the already above-mentioned long-lasting civil war 
has left its marks significantly. Despite the formation of the TFG in 2004 political 
instability persists as the TFG is not able to control the country to a sufficient extent. Large 
parts of the country and in particular the coastal areas constitute a legal vacuum.38 The 
coastal population suffers from poverty, hunger and civil insecurity. In view of depressed 
economic conditions, unemployment and desperation there is no shortage of willing 
recruits for pirate operations. To join groups  involved in piracy often seems to be the only 
possibility to improve the personal desolate situation for many young, uneducated and 
unemployed Somalis. Piracy is regarded as a quick way for all participating pirates to earn 
much larger amounts of money than by any other means of income generation.39 
 
But also external factors have contributed to the current situation. Lacking a 
national government which is able to enforce the law in its own territorial waters, foreign 
vessels exploited these circumstances for illegal fishing and dumping of hazardous waste 
into the sea off the coast of Somalia since the mid 1990s.40 Consequently, the reduction of 
maritime resources due to the illegal operations served as a justification for Somalis to 
attack the foreign vessels, claiming they were authorised coast guards commissioned to 
protect Somalia’s fishing resources and environment.41 Although it might be unjustifiable 
to hold the foreign vessels for ransom, one should not underestimate the additional effect 
of these illegal operations in providing further incentives for piratical attacks, first against 
illegal operating vessels, later against any vessels sailing close to the Somali coast. 
                                                           
37 Ibid. 
38 EA Ceska & M Ashkenazi ‘Piraterie vor den afrikanischen Kuesten und ihre Ursachen’ (2009) 34-35 APuZ 
33 at 33. 
39 See the Final Report of the International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast (note 32), p. 14-19). 
40 Ceska & Ashkenazi (note 38) at 34. 
41 HR Heitman ‘Dealing with Piracy in African Waters’, handout on p. 3, speech at the Combating and 
Preventing Sea Piracy in Africa Summit 2009, Cape Town, 26 - 28 August 2009. 
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CHAPTER 2: Piracy versus Maritime Terrorism  
 
Before examining the existing legal framework against piracy, it makes sense to clarify the 
relationship between piracy and maritime terrorism as both of these terms are more and 
more frequently used interchangeable by many authors trying to cover all forms of 
maritime violence without sticking to basic features of either piracy or terrorism anymore. 
 
I. Distinction of Piracy and Maritime Terrorism 
It is not surprising that owed to the political atmosphere, the mass media and governments 
the line between piracy and acts of maritime terrorism is increasingly blurred. In the wake 
of the 9/11 attacks officials stated their concern of how easily large vessels such as oil 
tankers could be hijacked in order to use them as weapons to block commercial waterways 
or to attack busy harbours.42 The most recent examples of maritime terrorism include the 
suicide attack against the American warship USS Cole in the port of Aden in 2000, the 
bombing of the oil tanker Limburg in the Gulf of Aden off Yemen in 200243 and the 
Superferry 14 bombing off the port of Manila, Philippines, the world’s deadliest terrorist 
attack at sea.44 
 
Although the United Nations General Assembly passed resolutions condemning 
terrorism and adopted several conventions on terrorism, by now there is no internationally 
agreed definition on terrorism.45 With regard to piracy, however, it is argued that ‘terrorism 
on the high seas can equal piracy under international law’46 and that ‘[just] as terrorists 
learned to be pilots for 9/11, terrorists may now be learning to be pirates’.47 Both piracy 
and maritime terrorism are ‘forms of violent interference with shipping’ and constitute ‘a 
threat to all states’ so that similar theories may be applied.48 
 
                                                           
42 E Barrios ‘Casting a Wider Net: Addressing the Maritime Piracy Problem in Southeast Asia’ (2005) 28 B. 
C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 149 at 151. 
43 R Collins & D Hassan ‘Applications and Shortcomings of the Law of the Sea in Combating Piracy: A 
South East Asian Perspective’ (2009) 40 J. Mar. L. & Com. 89 at 99; M Mejia & PK Mukherjee ‘Selected 
Issues of Law and Ergonomics in Maritime Security’ (2004) 10(4) JIML 316 at 321.  
44 S Das ‘Mean Acts of Islamic Terrorism on Mighty Oceans’ (13.01.2008), available at 
http://www.news.faithfreedom.org/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1695 [Accessed 01.12.2009]. 
45 T Deen ‘POLITICS: U.N. Member States Struggle to Define Terrorism’ (25.07.2005), available at 
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=29633 [Accessed 01.12.2009]. 
46 Bahar (note 5) at 6. 
47 JS Burnett ‘The Next 9/11 Could Happen at Sea’ (22.02.2005) The 4ew York Times, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/22/opinion/22burnett.html [Accessed 01.12.2009]. 
48 H Tuerk ‘Combating Terrorism at Sea – The Suppression of Unlawful Act against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation’ (2008) 15 U. Miami Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 337 at 342-3. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
LL.M. THESIS – THORSTE RESCH (UIVERSITY OF CAPE TOW) 
 13
Despite some similarities such as tactics of how to seize and hijack vessels, there 
are prevailing differences between piracy and maritime terrorism particularly in terms of 
their causes, objectives and the way of execution of their acts. Probably the most 
significant difference is that piracy is a crime motivated by greed and committed for 
immediate financial and private gain, while terrorism is motivated by political or 
ideological goals beyond the immediate act of attacking and hijacking a maritime target.49 
Therefore terrorists seek publicity, they frequently cause as much harm as possible in order 
to draw attention to their acts and to induce fear and terror, whereas pirates act with stealth 
seeking to avoid attention and inflict only necessary harm to accomplish their objectives.50 
Moreover, with regard to potential targets of pirates or terrorists, the ‘victims of piracy 
have to be “materially satisfying”’ to the perpetrators who may attach importance to 
geographically sensitive locations but not to nationality, religion or political beliefs, 
whereas terrorists choose targets of symbolic significance.51 Altogether there are decisive 
differences between piratical acts and acts of terrorism.52 
 
II. Grey Area between Piracy and Maritime Terrorism 
Considering these decisive differences, however, it is easily conceivable that some 
incidents may fall within a grey area combining features of piracy and (maritime) 
terrorism, for instance if the piratical act is conducted in order to finance terrorism and thus 
it is very likely that the pirates belong to a terrorist group.53 In principle though there is still 
much uncertainty about possible connections between piracy and maritime terrorism and at 
present no link between them has been proven yet.54 
 
The situation is similar in Somalia where a linkage of Somali pirates and the 
militant Somali Islamist group Al Shabab is in question. Although both groups have the 
same objective of uncontrolled access to the sea, their reasons differ from each other as the 
Somali pirates want to continue plundering passing maritime trade while Al Shabab is 
dependent on secure movement of illegal weapons, manpower and other material support. 
                                                           
49 H Fouché ‘Piracy, Armed Robbery and Terrorism at Sea: Synonyms or Separate Crimes’, handout on 
p. 29, workshop at the Combating and Preventing Sea Piracy in Africa Summit 2009, Cape Town, 26 - 28 
August 2009; see also LM Diaz & BH Dubner ‘An Examination of the Evolution of Crimes at Sea and the 
Emergence of the Many Legal Regimes in Their Wake’ (2009) 34 4.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 521 at 540. 
50 TM Sittnick ‘State Responsibility and Maritime Terrorism in the Strait of Malacca: Persuading Indonesia 
and Malaysia to Take Additional Steps to Secure the Strait’ (2005) 14 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y J. 743 at 751. 
51 Xu (note 16) at 646. 
52 Collins & Hassan (note 43) at 100. 
53 Xu (note 16) at 646. 
54 Corresponding remarks by Captain F van Rooyen in his speech (‘Securing Trade Conducted by Sea’) at the 
Combating and Preventing Sea Piracy in Africa Summit 2009, Cape Town, 26 - 28 August 2009. 
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Another aspect militating against a link between piracy and terrorism is that the number of 
piratical attacks decreased when the Union of Islamic Courts which is closely related to Al 
Shabab took control of several land bases of the pirates during the second half of 2006.55 
The reason for that development though may also have been caused by the fact that the 
monsoon prevented the Somali pirates from making more attacks in that period. In any 
case, a definite connection between Somali pirates and Al Shabab has not been proven 
yet.56 
                                                           
55 See the Final Report of the International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast (note 32), p. 20. 
56 S Askins, INCE & Co, Shipping E-Brief October 2009 at 6, available at 
http://www.incelaw.com/documents/pdf/Strands/Shipping/Shipping-e-Brief/Shipping-e-Brief-October-2009 
[Accessed 02.12.2009]. 
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CHAPTER 3: Existing International Legal Framework against Piracy 
 
Due to the fact that maritime traffic constitutes ninety per cent of the world trade, states 
have a keen interest in preventing and combating piracy.57 In the following chapter the 
scope of the existing international legal framework will be examined by having a look at 
the application of customary international law, the development of international 
conventions and the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council. During 
that examination the special focus will be on the issues of defining the term of piracy and 
identifying the still existing gaps of the current legal framework against piracy. Whenever 
appropriate the specific situation off the coast of Somalia will be considered. 
 
I. Piracy’s Origins in Customary International Law 
The crime of piracy, being admittedly the earliest international crime,58 was originally 
governed by customary international law before it was largely regulated by several 
international conventions as will be outlined below.59 As not all states are signatories to 
any of these international conventions dealing with piracy the application of customary 
international law and its treatment with the matter of piracy is still of significant 
importance.60 Basically two elements are considered necessary to constitute a rule of 
customary international law, namely a settled state practice (usus) and the belief that such 
behaviour is ‘law’ (opinion iuris).61 International law generally applies only among states 
being the typical subjects of law as entities with capacity to exercise legal rights and 
duties.62 Accordingly, the question arises as to how pirates can be convicted of the crime of 
piracy being non-state actors. 
 
The answer to this concept of state versus non-state conflict lies in universal 
jurisdiction of states.63 ‘True universal jurisdiction applies only in the case of crimes under 
customary international law, in respect of which all states have the right to prosecute’, such 
as in the case of piracy.64 The establishment of piracy as an ius cogens crime and the 
international recognition of such extensive jurisdiction, which, however, may still be 
limited by extradition agreements, principles of comity and the acknowledgement of state 
                                                           
57 Dubner (note 18) at 632. 
58 J Dugard International Law – A South African Perspective 3rd (2008) at 159. 
59 Collins & Hassan (note 43) at 93. 
60 Garmon (note 31) at 259. 
61 MN Shaw International Law 6th (2008) at 74. 
62 I Brownlie Principles of Public International Law 7th (2008) at 57. 
63 Bahar (note 5) at 11. 
64 Dugard (note 58) at 157. 
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sovereignty, is owed to the severe threat of piracy to maritime commerce.65 States realised 
that piracy was too uncontrollable and cruel in order to legitimate it as a ‘tool of political 
persuasion’,66 and thus, pirates became hostes humani generis. As ‘pirates were not subject 
to the authority of any state [anymore] … no state could be held responsible’ for their acts 
of violence under international law.67 Nonetheless, it has to be stressed that exercising 
universal jurisdiction over international crimes like piracy is permitted by international 
law, but states are not obligated by it ‘to do so in the absence of a treaty obligation.’68 
 
Although customary international law commonly recognises universal jurisdiction 
over crimes of piracy it does not provide a clear definition of piracy. Therefore, several 
ambiguities exist such as whether piracy requires intent to rob (animus furandi), whether 
acts of insurgents fighting against their government should be excluded from piracy (like 
acts by state vessels or recognised belligerents) or whether acts have to involve at least two 
vessels.69 Brierly noted: ‘There is no authoritative definition of international piracy, but it 
is of the essence of a piratical act to be an act of violence, committed at sea or at any rate 
closely connected with the sea, by persons not acting under proper authority.’70 Finally it 
took until 1958 for the first international convention, namely the Convention on the High 
Seas also referred to as the Geneva Convention, to be established in order to codify the 
customary regime on piracy in an attempt to clarify its definition. 
 
II. United ations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
1. Historical Background 
The currently existing international law on piracy is set out in Articles 100 to 107, 110 
and 111 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The 
convention resulted from the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and 
was concluded in 1982. UNCLOS replaced the already above-mentioned Convention on 
the High Seas from 1958, adopting its provisions relating to piracy with minor changes and 
particularly restating the wording of its Article 15 verbatim stipulating the definition of 
                                                           
65 Garmon (note 31) at 260. 
66 Burgess (note 2) at 299. 
67 Tuerk (note 48) at 342. 
68 Dugard (note 58) at 157. 
69 M Halberstam ‘Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on 
Maritime Safety’ (1988) 82 Am. J. Int’l L. 269 at 272-3. 
70 J Brierly The Law of 4ations (1928) at 154, cited in ‘Part IV – Piracy’, Harvard Research in International 
Law, Draft Convention on Piracy with Comments, (1932) 26 Am. J. Int’l L. Supplement 739 at 750 
[hereinafter Harvard Draft Convention]. 
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piracy.71 Despite the fact that UNCLOS as a treaty is normally only binding to signatory 
states, it is generally accepted that its provisions are regarded as a codification of 
customary international law and thus are also binding to states not party to the convention 
such as the United States of America, Venezuela and Israel.72 
 
The conventions under the United Nations regime were not the first attempts to 
establish provisions on piracy. Already in 1924 the League of Nations made efforts to 
provide a multilateral agreement on the law of piracy.73 At that time, however, piracy no 
longer appeared to be ‘a pressing issue to the international community’ and moreover, as it 
was unlikely that an agreement would be reached, the subject was finally not included in 
the agenda of a proposed conference.74 Later in 1932, the Harvard Research Group drafted 
piracy provisions taking into account various domestic laws of piracy as well as customary 
international law of piracy.75 This so-called Harvard Draft Convention subsequently 
formed the basis for the Convention on the High Seas in 1958.76 When examining the 
UNCLOS provisions in more detail there will be more extensive remarks to the Harvard 
Draft Convention where required and useful. 
 
2. Different Juridical Categories of Waters 
Before taking a critical look at the piracy provisions of UNCLOS it is necessary to 
introduce the approach of UNCLOS which is to ‘stratify the waters of the earth into 
different juridical categories’.77 More precisely, UNCLOS distinguishes between the 
                                                           
71 T Treves ‘Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of Somalia’ (2009) 20 
Eur. J. Int’l L. 399 at 401; Articles 100 to 107 UNCLOS repeat almost literally Articles 14 to 22 of the 
Convention on the High Seas. 
72 RR Churchill & AV Lowe The Law of the Sea 3rd (1999); Barrios (note 42) at 153; Bahar (note 5) at 10; 
Treves (note 71) at 401; regardless of customary international law, the United States of America, Venezuela 
and Israel are also still bound by the Convention on the High Seas; for further information on ratifications, 
accessions and successions to UNCLOS see 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm [Accessed 
04.12.2005]; some scholars argue though that ‘customary international law on piracy encompassed a broader 
scope of activity than the restrictive definition found in UNCLOS’, see Barrios (note 42) at 161, also 
providing further references. 
73 Azubuike (note 6) at 48. 
74 Rubin (note 7) at 331-5; also quoting the Polish Representative (M. Zaleski) approved by the Council of 
the League of Nations on 13 June 1927: “It is perhaps doubtful whether the question of Piracy is of sufficient 
real interest in the present state of the world to justify its inclusion in the programme of the [proposed] 
conference, if the scope of the conference ought to be cut down. The subject is in any case not one of vital 
interests for every State, or one the treatment of which can be regarded as in any way urgent, and the replies 
of certain Governments with regard to it indicate that there are difficulties in the way of concluding a 
universal agreement.” 
75 Collins & Hassan (note 43) at 95. 
76 The Harvard Draft Convention consists of 18 articles directly related to piracy, see the whole draft with 
comments in ‘Part IV – Piracy’ (1932) 26 Am. J. Int’l L. Supplement 739 et seq. 
77 Azubuike (note 6) at 49. 
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territorial sea (Articles 2 to 32), the contiguous zone (Article 33), the exclusive economic 
zone (Articles 55 to 75) and the high seas (Articles 86 to 120). Pointing out the distinction 
between the different zones is essential in order to analyse the occasionally limited scope 
of UNCLOS with regard to piratical acts as will be shown below. 
 
Article 3 UNCLOS provides that a littoral state’s territorial sea may extend up to 
twelve nautical miles from its coastline, within which the state has the same sovereignty as 
it has with regard to its land territory, Article 2 UNCLOS. The state exercises exclusive 
jurisdiction over these territorial waters subject to the right of innocent passage which in 
terms of Articles 17 to 19 UNCLOS allows vessels of coastal and land-locked states to 
navigate through the territorial sea of a littoral state for peaceful purposes. 
 
Article 33 UNCLOS stipulates that the contiguous zone extends for further twelve 
nautical miles beyond the territorial sea. The jurisdiction of the littoral state is limited 
within the contiguous zone as the state may only exercise the control necessary to prevent 
infringements of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its 
territory or territorial sea and where appropriate to punish suchlike infringements. 
 
Subject to Article 57 UNCLOS a littoral state can claim up to 200 nautical miles 
from its coastline as part of its exclusive economic zone. According to Article 56 
UNCLOS a state is granted the sovereign rights to exclusively explore and exploit the 
marine resources within the exclusive economic zone. 
 
The high seas, as stipulated in Article 86 UNCLOS, are all those parts of the seas 
which are not included in the exclusive economic zone, the contiguous zone or the 
territorial sea. In terms of Article 87 UNCLOS the high seas are open to all coastal and 
land-locked states and the freedom of the high seas is to be exercised under the conditions 
laid down by UNCLOS. 
 
Lastly, for the sake of completeness, it is noteworthy that internal waters, which, 
according to Article 8 UNCLOS, are waters on the landward side of the baseline, and ports 
are under the sovereignty of the littoral state and this sovereignty is not restricted by the 
right of passage of vessels of other states.78 
                                                           
78 Beckman (note 17) at 327. 
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3. Piracy Provisions under UCLOS 
The UNCLOS piracy provisions are embodied in Articles 100 to 107, 110 and 111. They 
determine the requirements to constitute an offence under UNCLOS and define the rights 
and obligations of all states party to the convention such as inter alia the issue of universal 
jurisdiction for the prosecution of pirates, the right of hot pursuit and the matter of 
international cooperation. In the following the UNCLOS definition of piracy will serve as a 
starting point in order to examine the often criticised ambiguities and shortcomings of the 
UNCLOS piracy regime. 
 
(a) The Definition of Piracy 
Article 101 UNCLOS provides the definition of piracy: 
 
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(a)  any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship 
or a private aircraft, and directed: 
(i)  on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against 
persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii)  against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place 
outside the jurisdiction of any State; 
(b)  any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or an aircraft 
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c)  any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in 
subparagraph (a) or (b). 
 
Accordingly the definition consists of four essential elements, namely (i) an illegal 
act of violence, (ii) the commitment for private ends, (iii) the occurrence on the high seas, 
and (iv) the requirement of two ships being involved. 
 
(i) Illegal Act of Violence 
As already mentioned above there are several different types of piracy, from clandestine 
thefts when the vessel is at anchor or berthed in the pier to the capture of vessels while 
being underway, from taking ship’s crews hostage for ransom to hijacking the vessels in 
order to use them as phantom ships. In the latter case an act of violence may frequently be 
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answered in the affirmative as these more sophisticated pirates usually do not hesitate to 
use force against ship’s crews. On the contrary, in the former case a clandestine attack may 
not be covered by the UNCLOS definition of piracy in absence of a violent conduct, 
‘unless the act of trespassing is considered depredation’ in terms of Article 101(a) 
UNCLOS.79 
 
However, certain incidents would be conceivable where the perpetrators are visibly 
armed but only threaten violence which is sufficient to induce the ship’s crew to cooperate. 
If construed broadly, threatening violence could still meet the requirements of an ‘act of 
violence’ in terms of Article 101(a) UNCLOS. Otherwise the threatened violence may be 
characterised as an ‘act of depredation’ which is usually comprised of an element of 
force.80 
 
Regarding the situation around the Horn of Africa, Somali pirates almost 
exclusively take ship’s crews hostage for ransom which in most instances will not lead to 
any problems of whether falling within the definition of violence under UNCLOS or not. 
Nonetheless, the lack of a clear and unambiguous provision should not be underestimated 
as in other hot spots of piracy, where more various types of piratical attacks occur, the 
deficiency of the element of an ‘act of violence’ may cause much more confusion and 
consequently may hinder a successful prosecution of the perpetrators. 
 
(ii) Commitment for Private Ends 
Subject to Article 101(a) UNCLOS an act has to be committed ‘for private ends’ to be 
regarded as a piratical attack. The denotation of ‘private ends’ is interpreted differently. On 
the one hand it is argued that an act ‘for political or other ends is generally excluded’ from 
the UNCLOS definition.81 On the other hand the element of ‘private ends’ is understood 
more broadly, that is to say that ‘the violence involved is not public’ and thus that not ‘all 
politically motivated violence’ is necessarily excluded because the perpetrators are not 
pirates due to ‘their subjective motives but because their acts impinge upon States’ 
monopoly on legitimate violence and their interests in freedom of navigation’.82 
 
                                                           
79 Collins & Hassan (note 43) at 97. 
80 Collins & Hassan (note 43) at 96-7. 
81 Z Keyuan ‘New Developments in the International Law of Piracy’ (2009) 8 Chinese J. Int’l L. 323 at 325. 
82 D Guilfoyle ‘Piracy off Somalia: UN Security Council Resolution 1816 and IMO Regional Counter-Piracy 
Efforts’ (2008) 57(3) ICLQ 690 at 693. 
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Accordingly, the scope of Article 101 UNCLOS is vague in cases in which vessels 
and their passengers are attacked for political ends like in the Achille Lauro incident in 
1985. In that case Palestinian terrorists, who were disguised as passengers, hijacked the 
cruise ship in the Mediterranean Sea and an American Jewish passenger was killed when 
demands for the release of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel were not met.83 At that time, 
the prevalent opinion on that issue was that acts committed for a public purpose were not 
covered by the UNCLOS definition and in consequence efforts were made to close this gap 
by adopting the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) in 1988, which will be outlined below in more 
detail (see p. 31). 
 
In order to determine the correct denotation of the term ‘for private ends’, a further 
look at its origins in the Harvard Draft Convention is useful, which stipulates piracy in 
Article 3(1) as  
 
Any act of violence or of depredation committed with intent to rob, rape, wound, 
enslave, imprison or kill a person or with intent to steal or destroy property, for 
private ends without bona fide purpose of asserting a claim of right, provided that 
the act is connected with an attack on or from the sea or in or from the air. 
 
Although the element ‘for private ends’ is likewise not defined in the in the Harvard 
Draft Convention, two further aspects deduced from its travaux préparatoires can be 
pointed out. 
 
Firstly, the ‘private ends’ requirement was used to exclude acts by unrecognised 
insurgents who attacked vessels of the government which they attempted to overthrow.84 
Excluding such political activities in the era when the Harvard Draft Convention emerged 
made sense because the process of decolonisation had begun and the colonial powers had 
an interest in narrowing the scope of consideration for piratical acts as otherwise signatory 
states would have been obliged to enforce the law of the sea.85 
 
Secondly, the term ‘for private ends’ was not used to restrict the scope of piracy to 
                                                           
83 For more details see DJ Harris Cases and Materials on International Law 6th (2004) at 459. 
84 Halberstam (note 69) at 277. 
85 Garmon (note 31) at 263. 
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acts committed with an intent to rob as Bingham commented to the Harvard Draft 
Convention: ‘Acts done with other purposes than robbery also are put under the common 
jurisdiction, although the typical piracy is usually defined as robbery on the high seas; for 
there is no good reason why one who does an act with intent to kill, wound, rape, enslave 
or imprison, or to steal or maliciously destroy property, which would be piracy if done to 
rob, should not be subjected to more probable retribution through the common jurisdiction 
of all states’.86 
 
Against the backdrop of all these different aspects it appears to be more appropriate 
that the ‘private ends’ requirement excludes acts of maritime terrorism motivated by 
political and public aims respectively, as such acts of maritime terrorists are most likely 
comparable to the acts of unrecognised insurgents which are not regarded as pirates.87 
 
Concerning acts by Somali pirates the element of ‘private ends’ basically does not 
restrict the scope of UNCLOS of combating piracy off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of 
Aden. As previously mentioned, no concrete link between Somali pirates and terrorist 
groups has been proven yet and thus it cannot be assumed that the pirates commit their acts 
for political ends. A still quite vague issue but potentially more critical one could result 
from the assumption that at least some operating Somali pirates may be commissioned by 
Somali local politicians.88 
 
(iii) Occurrence on the High Seas 
Article 101(a) UNCLOS provides that the offence has to occur on the high seas, 
alternatively in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State. As the latter variant is 
extremely unlikely these days, the scope of the UNCLOS piracy definition is basically 
limited to acts on the high seas which in terms of Article 86 UNCLOS cover all those parts 
of the seas not included in the exclusive economic zone, the contiguous zone or the 
territorial sea. This geographical limitation means a significant restriction of acts which 
can be regarded as piracy under UNCLOS. 
 
However, subject to Article 58(2) UNCLOS the piracy provisions also apply to the 
exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with Part V of UNCLOS 
                                                           
86 Harvard Draft Convention (note 70) at 786. 
87 Z Keyuan ‘Seeking Effectiveness for the Crackdown of Piracy at Sea’ (2005) 59(1) J. Int’l Aff. 117 at 119. 
88 See Keyuan (note 81) at 328, referring to a Chinese information source. 
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dealing with rights and duties of littoral states and other users of the exclusive economic 
zone, especially with regard to marine resources. Although the littoral state enjoys several 
sovereign rights within the exclusive economic zone, ‘some high seas freedoms are 
preserved there, such as the freedom of navigation’.89 Piracy has remarkable effects on the 
exercise of navigational freedom and the enforcement of the UNCLOS piracy provisions 
may not be regarded as a violation of the littoral state’s sovereign rights. Therefore, it is 
well-recognised that the piracy provisions are not incompatible with Part V and 
consequently, their application within the exclusive economic zone is possible.90 
 
Nonetheless, the limitation of the scope of UNCLOS by not including the territorial 
sea remains considerable. Apart from the fact that states are inherently reluctant to 
surrender parts of their sovereignty when conventions are adopted, one of the main reasons 
for the current restriction under UNCLOS is associated with the historical development 
and implementation of the piracy provisions. 
 
As regards the Harvard Draft Convention, Article 1 distinguishes between 
jurisdiction over the ‘territorial sea’ and the ‘high sea’, but does not stipulate any effective 
demarcation between the two seas. Accordingly, Article 1(3) of the Harvard Draft 
Convention only says that the ‘term “high sea” means that part of the sea which is not 
included in the territorial waters of any state’. At the time when the piracy provisions were 
developed most littoral states only claimed up to three nautical miles from its coastline as 
part of its territorial see.91 That three nautical miles limit was also recognised under the 
Convention on the High Seas.92 With the adoption of UNCLOS the extent of the territorial 
seas was quadrupled from three to twelve nautical miles and additionally the exclusive 
economic zone was implemented. These changes took place without adjusting the piracy 
provisions to the new framework of modified juridical categories of waters in order to 
maintain an effective anti-piracy regime under UNCLOS.93 During the negotiation and 
adoption of UNCLOS between 1973 and 1982, the subject of ‘piracy was not an issue on 
the agenda’.94 The narrowness of the UNCLOS piracy definition with respect to the ‘high 
seas’ requirement is therefore essentially owed to the failure of evolving the piracy 
                                                           
89 Keyuan (note 81) at 325. 
90 Dubner (note 18) at 633; Sittnick (note 50) at 758; Stiles (note 13) at 308. 
91 Beckman (note 17) at 328. 
92 Collins & Hassan (note 43) at 95. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Keyuan (note 81) at 326. 
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provisions in accordance with other UNCLOS provisions. 
 
However, the effects of the geographical limitation of the definition may vary 
considerably. While attacks against vessels in the narrow Strait of Malacca predominantly 
cannot be regarded as piracy under UNCLOS because most of them occur in the territorial 
seas of the littoral states and only few in the exclusive economic zone or on the high seas, 
the situation is different around the Horn of Africa.95 The development off the coast of 
Somalia shows that pirates are nowadays capable of attacking vessels far beyond the 
exclusive economic zone, that is to say on the high seas up to almost 500 nautical miles 
from the coast.96 Basically the problem of capturing these Somali pirates remains, 
however, as according to UNCLOS, hot pursuits must cease when the pirates enter into 
territorial waters as will be shown below (see p. 27). 
 
(iv) Two Ship Requirement 
Article 101(a) UNCLOS defines that an act of piracy only exists if the action is taken by 
one ship against another one. The element reflects the traditional definition of piratical acts 
conducted by a group of perpetrators on a ship who attack and plunder other ships.97 
Contrary to some earlier conceptions of piracy, after which piratical acts could also be 
‘committed by persons who were already on board the victim vessel as passengers or 
crew’, the UNCLOS definition basically excludes suchlike ‘internal seizures’.98 
Correspondingly, the Achille Lauro incident was not considered piracy because besides the 
failure of the ‘private ends’ requirement as mentioned above the ‘two ship’ requirement 
was not met either. 
 
However, two aspects indicate that the involvement of two vessels should not be 
construed too strictly. Firstly, Article 101(b) UNCLOS provides that piracy can also 
consist of participating ‘in the operation of a ship ... with knowledge of facts making it a 
pirate ship’ and consequently the ‘provision seems to open the concept of modern piracy to 
                                                           
95 For detailed remarks to incidents and different types of piracy in Southeast Asia see Beckman (note 17) at 
322 et seq. 
96 See Piracy Prone Areas announced by the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, available at http://www.icc-
ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=70&Itemid=58 [Accessed 08.12.2009].  
97 Gabel (note 15) at 1443. 
98 I Shearer ‘Piracy’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law at 15, available at 
http://www.mpepil.com/subscriber_article?script=yes&id=/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-
e1206&recno=30&letter=P [Accessed 08.12.2009]. 
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either a hostile takeover of a vessel by insiders or by outside renegades’.99 Secondly, it is 
also stated in the comments to the Harvard Draft Convention that the intent was merely to 
exclude criminal acts by one passenger or crew member against another.100  
 
Particularly with regard to Somali pirates the question arises of which kind of pirate 
vessel meets the requirements of Article 101(a) UNCLOS. As Somali pirates usually use 
very fast skiffs or rubber boats operating from land bases or from mother ships it is 
doubtful whether these boats can be regarded as a ‘ship’ in terms of UNCLOS.101 Other 
than that the incidents around the Horn of Africa generally fulfil the element of two vessels 
involved. 
 
(b) Rights and Obligations under UCLOS 
After having determined that a committed act of violence is covered by the UNCLOS 
piracy definition, the states party to the convention have several rights but also obligations 
as to how to take any anti-piracy measures. 
 
(i) Universal Jurisdictional 
According to states’ universal jurisdiction for the apprehension and prosecution of pirates 
under customary international law, Article 105 UNCLOS allows every state, on the high 
seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state, to seize a pirate ship and to 
arrest the persons involved. The provision further provides that subsequently the courts of 
the state which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties imposed, and may 
also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships. Insofar Article 105 
UNCLOS constitutes an exception to the general rule of exclusive jurisdiction of the flag 
state on the high seas.102 
 
Article 107 UNCLOS clarifies that such seizures are only to be conducted by 
warships, military vessels or other explicitly marked governmental vessels, as for instance 
states’ coast guards. Subject to Article 106 UNCLOS states can be held liable if the seizure 
                                                           
99 Gabel (note 15) at 1443. 
100 Harvard Draft Convention (note 70) at 815 with reference to L Oppenheim International Law 4th (1928) at 
sec. 274: ‘[A] simple act of violence on the part of crew or passengers does not constitute in itself the crime 
of piracy, not at least as far as International Law is concerned. If, for instance, the crew were to murder the 
master on account of his cruelty, and afterwards carried on the voyage, they would be murderers, but not 
pirates. They are pirates only when the revolt is directed, not merely against the master, but also against the 
vessel, for the purpose of converting her and her goods to their own use.’. 
101 Treves (note 71) at 402; Mejia & Mukherjee (note 14) at 182. 
102 Beckman (note 17) at 328. 
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of a vessel has been conducted without adequate grounds. Moreover, although Article 105 
UNCLOS entitles states to exercise universal jurisdiction over piratical acts, the wording 
‘may’ indicates that states are not obliged to do so, for example if they are not directly 
affected by the incident.103  
 
Despite granting states wide-ranging rights to apprehend suspects of piratical acts 
the problem of prosecuting the perpetrators remains, since the prosecution is subject to the 
apprehending state’s domestic law which may vary tremendously from state to state.104 
There is a lack of uniformity with regard to penalties imposed on pirates by different 
apprehending states, the applied legal proceedings and the treatment of seized ships 
including recovered goods.105 Also conceivable and even more critical is the situation in 
which the apprehending state does not have any domestic legislation dealing specifically 
with piracy and thus, the pirates may escape punishment.106 
 
The application of universal jurisdiction under UNCLOS can therefore generally be 
described as a ‘double edged sword’ as on the one hand it enables states to apprehend and 
prosecute pirates on the high seas but on the other hand ‘it provides too much freedom in 
the manner in which [states] may penalise the pirates, which is dependent on each state’s 
domestic legislation’.107 
 
Looking at the situation in Somalia, two specific problems become apparent. 
Firstly, due to the persisting political instability the TFG is not able to control the country 
sufficiently. Thus, no serious prosecution of pirates by Somali authorities takes place and 
deficiencies in terms of domestic legislation dealing with piracy appear irrelevant. 
Secondly, the states whose warships are patrolling the waters off the coast of 
Somalia are frequently very reluctant to do more than capturing the pirates in order to avert 
further damage from maritime traffic and international trade. Several incidents have been 
reported when pirates went unpunished because navies released pirates shortly after having 
captured them on account of insufficient interests of the apprehending state in their 
                                                           
103 Bahar (note 5) at 13. 
104 See J Kavanagh ‘The Law of Contemporary Sea Piracy’ (1999) Austl. Int’l L. J. 127 at 139. 
105 Collins & Hassan (note 43) at 102. 
106 Cf. BH Dubner The Law of International Sea Piracy (1980) at 151; however, the lack of having specific 
legislation dealing with the punishment of piracy did not prevent China from bringing pirates into its courts 
and trying them under the charge of crimes such as murder or robbery, corresponding to the relevant Chinese 
criminal law, see in more detail Keyuan (note 81) at 342. 
107 Collins & Hassan (note 43) at 103. 
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prosecution.108 In other cases officials expressed concerns that captured pirates might 
either claim asylum in the apprehending state or that the transfer of the pirates to Somalia 
or other states in the region applying Islamic law could breach their human rights as they 
might face beheading for murder or having a hand chopped off for theft.109 In recent times, 
whenever an apprehending state opted for the prosecution of pirates, the perpetrators were 
mostly sent to Kenya to grant a fair trial.110 Contrary to this ‘common’ practice however, it 
is argued that Article 105 UNCLOS ‘was intended to preclude transfers to third-party 
states’ such as Kenya referring to the drafting history.111 However, no court or tribunal has 
yet dealt with that issue. 
 
(ii) Right of Hot Pursuit 
Article 111 UNCLOS provides the right of hot pursuit. A vessel which is suspected to have 
committed a piratical act within the territorial sea of a state and thereby violated the laws 
and regulations of that state can be pursued into the high seas. This right is limited subject 
to Article 111(3) UNCLOS stating that the right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the vessel 
pursued enters the territorial sea of its own or a third state. By way of comparison, the right 
of hot pursuit stipulated in Article 7(1) of the Harvard Draft Convention is less restrictive 
because, if the pursuit of a pirate ship is commenced by a state within its own territorial sea 
or on the high seas, the pursuit of such a ship may be continued into or over the territorial 
sea of another state, unless prohibited by the other state. Hence, the Harvard Draft 
Convention does not attach as much importance to the sovereign rights within territorial 
seas as UNCLOS.112 
 
In order to strengthen the right of hot pursuit it has been argued that the 
enforcement of piracy provisions within the territorial sea of states is not expressly 
prohibited by UNCLOS.113 This approach appears to be precarious. Although it may be 
admitted that the coastal state is in a way morally obliged under UNCLOS to permit the 
                                                           
108 See Spiegel Online (15.09.2009), available at 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,649004,00.html [Accessed 09.12.2009]. 
109 M Woolf ‘Pirates Can Claim UK Asylum’ (13.04.2009) Times Online, available at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article3736239.ece [Accessed 09.12.2009]. 
110 Askins (note 56) at 6. 
111 Kontorovich (note 20) referring to the Report of the International Law Commission at 283, Commentary 
of Art. 43: “This article gives any State the right to seize pirate ships ... and to have them adjudicated upon by 
its courts. This right cannot be exercised at a place under the jurisdiction of another State.”. 
112 Stiles (note 13) at 309. 
113 See BH Dubner ‘Human Rights and Environmental Disaster – Two Problems That Defy the “Norms” of 
the International Law of Sea Piracy’ (1997) Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 1 at 38, referring to comments by 
TA Clingan ‘The Law of Piracy’ in E Ellen Piracy at Sea (1989) at 170. 
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continuous pursuit of pirate ship by another state into its territorial sea in order to enforce 
the UNCLOS piracy provisions, it has to be emphasised that due to the territorial 
sovereignty of the coastal state some sort of its consent of the coastal state to the 
continuous pursuit is indispensable.114 Therefore the issue of continuing a pursuit into the 
territorial sea of another state is rather a matter of courtesy of the state whose sovereignty 
is concerned. 
 
The limitation of the right of hot pursuit is a substantial problem especially in areas 
with closely neighbouring territorial waters, such as in the Strait of Malacca in Southeast 
Asia. In addition, the problem is sometimes exacerbated by still unsettled territorial claims 
between neighbouring states which cause even more suspiciousness and reluctance of 
states to permit other states’ navies to enter into their territorial waters.115 
 
But also around the Horn of Africa Somali pirates who attack vessels on the high 
seas are frequently able ‘to evade pursuit by crossing into territorial waters’.116 As they 
apparently found out that foreign navy vessels are basically not allowed to pursue them 
into the Somali territorial sea they started to take advantage of this loophole of the 
international piracy regime. To counter this trend some scholars argue that a so-called 
‘failed state’ like Somalia which is unable to properly police and maintain the security of 
its own territorial sea and thus is unable to attend to its duty to the international community 
forfeits its UNCLOS right of inviolability of its territorial sea at least temporarily.117 
Furthermore, Somalia’s territorial sea could be regarded as ‘any other place outside the 
jurisdiction of any state’ in terms of Article 105 UNCLOS.118 Following this point of view, 
foreign navy vessels could continue the pursuit of Somali pirates from the high seas into 
the territorial sea of Somalia.  
 
However, even if in the case of Somalia the issue of statehood may legitimately be 
scrutinised according to international law, the just mentioned approach is in contrast to 
political reasons as it is of utmost importance that Somalia is reintegrated in the 
international community. Therefore, in cooperation with the TFG and under the auspices of 
the United Nations Security Council, the international community acted wisely to entitle 
                                                           
114 Mo (note 25) at 357-8. 
115 Collins & Hassan (note 43) at 103. 
116 Guilfoyle (note 82) at 694. 
117 Azubuike (note 6) at 52 and 54; Bahar (note 5) at 67-8. 
118 Bahar (note 5) at 69. 
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international naval forces to take anti-piracy measures also within the Somali territorial sea 
(see p. 41). Not only off the coast of Somalia but similarly in almost all hot spots of piracy 
the elimination of safe havens for pirates can basically serve as an effective remedy. 
 
(iii) International Cooperation 
Article 100 UNCLOS requires all states to cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the 
repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any 
state. The provision provides the opportunity for organising collective actions of all states 
party to the convention with the objective to combat piracy effectively.119 With regard to 
the title of the provision every state has not only the right to take measures against piracy 
but also the ‘duty’ to cooperate in doing so.120 In absence of a more precise definition of 
what is meant by ‘to the fullest possible extent’, there is uncertainty of which level of 
cooperation is required in respect of combating piracy on the high seas.121  
 
Referring to the drafting debates at the United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea in 1982 it becomes apparent that the provision of Article 100 UNCLOS should 
only demonstrate the intent to cooperate, that is to say that ‘non-compliance with the 
provision would not constitute a breach of international law’.122 Thus, a state would de 
facto not be obliged to cooperate if the state intended to avoid the prosecution of a pirate 
within its jurisdiction. 
 
Nonetheless, Article 100 UNCLOS can basically be construed from two different 
perspectives. Assumed the level of effort is to be assessed as very high objectively and 
consequently, it may include a system of well-coordinated coast guards and joint patrols, 
entire information sharing, extradition of perpetrators and even allowing foreign vessels to 
enter one’s own territorial sea. If assessed from the subjective perspective of each state, the 
level of effort will very likely differ significantly between states subject to their wealth and 
resources and additionally to regional relations between them in the past.123 
 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the possible cooperation of states concerning 
                                                           
119 Mo (note 25) at 347. 
120 Tuerk (note 48) at 342. 
121 Collins & Hassan (note 43) at 104. 
122 See Kavanagh (note 104) at 140-1. 
123 Collins & Hassan (note 43) at 104. 
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territorial waters is not even mentioned.124 
 
So far, Article 100 UNCLOS has not contributed very much to combat piracy. The 
main reason for the limited effectiveness of Article 100 UNCLOS is based on the fact that 
there is neither any ‘neutral body determining some minimum level of cooperation ... that 
states must satisfy’ nor any international agency which provides for the enforcement of 
signatory states’ duties.125  
 
(c) Interim Result 
It is incontestable that the UNCLOS piracy provisions constitute the main legal framework 
which generally serves as a useful tool to combat piracy. Nonetheless, the usefulness of 
UNCLOS is limited due to inconsistencies which affect the practical scope of the 
convention and the enforcement of its goals. 
 
On the one hand some provisions especially with regard to the piracy definition are 
overly stringent. Particularly the narrow and probably most frequent criticised high seas 
requirement is often not fulfilled and consequently many attacks are not covered by 
UNCLOS. It is also uncertain which piratical acts meet the condition of the violence 
component. The limiting effect of the private ends requirement as well as the two ship 
requirement though can basically be regarded as a useful means to separate the UNCLOS 
piracy provisions from maritime terrorism. 
 
On the other hand some provisions are discretionary to an inadequate extent. 
Although international cooperation is explicitly mentioned as a fundamental principle in 
order to combat piracy there is no anti-piracy body which could coordinate cooperation 
among states. In the absence of more organisational structure actual and effective 
cooperation only takes place very rarely because states can not be forced to fulfil their 
duties under UNCLOS. Moreover, the UNCLOS provisions are too indefinite in 
determining how to capture and prosecute pirates resulting in inconsistent practices of 
states dealing with pirates. 
 
With regard to the situation off the coast of Somalia the high seas requirement 
represents the most important shortcoming of UNCLOS (although the piracy provisions 
                                                           
124 Stiles (note 13) at 310. 
125 Collins & Hassan (note 43) at 104. 
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apply to the exclusive economic zone) along with the limitations of the right of hot pursuit. 
Somali pirates are frequently able to evade pursuit by crossing into territorial waters after 
having attacked vessels on the high seas or within the exclusive economic zone. 
 Besides, there is uncertainty whether skiffs or rubber boats operating from land 
bases or from mother ships can be considered as a ‘ship’ in terms of UNCLOS. 
 
III. SUA Convention 
1. Historical Background 
In response to the Achille Lauro incident when the limited scope of the UNCLOS piracy 
provisions became apparent, the international community made efforts to establish a legal 
basis for prosecuting maritime violence that was not covered by the UNCLOS 
framework.126 In 1988 under the auspices of the United Nations and the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO) respectively, the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988 SUA Convention), also 
referred to as the Rome Convention, was adopted. 
 
The models used in drafting the 1988 SUA Convention were the first two United 
Nations terrorism conventions, namely the Hague Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft from 1970 and the Montreal Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation from 1971.127 The 1988 SUA 
Convention is essentially based on these previously existing anti-terrorism conventions and 
bears close linguistic resemblance to them because many provisions were directly adapted 
to the maritime field.128 
 
Despite the convention’s usefulness in several incidents, the number of ratifications 
of or accessions to the convention increased only slowly until the 9/11 attacks when the 
international community became aware of possible threats to maritime safety which could 
develop in the future.129 Furthermore, the attack on the World Trade Center in New York 
gave reason to review the 1988 SUA Convention since it did not cover all acts of violence 
                                                           
126 AS Skaridov ‘Hostis Humani Generis’ in MH Nordquist et al. Legal Challenges in Maritime Security 
(2008) 479 at 481. 
127 RC Beckman ‘The 1988 SUA Convention and 2005 Protocol: Tools to Combat Piracy, Armed Robbery, 
and Maritime Terrorism’ in R Herbert-Burns et al. Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (2009) 187 
at 188-9. 
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endangering maritime safety.130 Finally after long negotiations the 2005 Protocol to the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (2005 SUA Protocol) was formally adopted. The 1988 SUA Convention and 
the 2005 SUA Protocol constitute the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 2005 (2005 SUA Convention) which so far has 
only been ratified by ten states.131 For the purpose of clarification the author will always 
refer to the amended 2005 SUA Convention if not indicated otherwise. 
 
Although the major aim of the SUA Convention is admittedly the suppression of 
maritime terrorism, its main features make it likewise a potentially appropriate tool to 
combat piracy.132 Below, the main elements of the SUA Convention will be examined, 
always focusing on the relevant aspects with regard to piracy and drawing comparisons to 
UNCLOS whenever appropriate. 
 
2. Relevant Provisions in Terms of Piracy 
The SUA Convention provisions which are of importance for combating piracy refer to 
both the definition of offences under the convention and the basic rights and obligations of 
all signatory states concerning inter alia matters of jurisdiction and international 
cooperation. It has to be emphasised that unlike UNCLOS, which is regarded as a 
reflection of customary international law, the SUA Convention is only binding on states 
party to it.133  
 
(a) Offences under the SUA Convention 
(i) Defining the Offences 
The 1988 SUA Convention contains the main provisions concerning unlawful acts against 
the safety of maritime navigation which establish offences under the convention. 
Article 3(1) of the 1988 SUA Convention defines that a person commits an offence by 
unlawfully and intentionally (a) seizing or exercising control over a vessel by force or 
threat thereof; or (b) by performing an act of violence against a person on board a vessel if 
that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that vessel; or (c) by destroying a vessel 
or causing damage to a vessel or to its cargo which is likely to endanger the safe navigation 
                                                           
130 Keyuan (note 81) at 330. 
131 Status of the 2005 SUA Convention as at 30 November 2009, see 
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=247 [Accessed 12.12.2009]. 
132 Mejia & Mukherjee (note 14) at 181. 
133 Azubuike (note 6) at 56. 
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of that vessel. Moreover, according to Article 3(2) of the 1988 SUA Convention also 
attempting to commit or abetting the commission of any of the just mentioned offences 
amount to an offence, as well as even threatening to commit offences in terms of 
Article 3(1)(b) or (c) constitutes an offence if the threat is likely to endanger the safe 
navigation of the vessel in question. 
 
When the 2005 SUA Protocol was adopted the list of offences was broadened by 
adding three categories of new offences.134 Firstly, Article 3bis (1)(a) of the 2005 SUA 
Protocol covers further unlawful acts within the scope of the 1988 SUA Convention with 
regard to using a vessel as a weapon or as a means to conduct a terrorist attack. Secondly, 
Article 3bis (1)(b) of the 2005 SUA Protocol contains non-proliferation offences, that is to 
say that the transport of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related 
materials is to be hampered and prosecuted. Thirdly, subject to Article 3ter of the 2005 
SUA Protocol the transport of any person by sea who has committed an offence in terms of 
the 1988 SUA Convention, the 2005 SUA Protocol or any of the other United Nations 
terrorism conventions constitutes an offence if the transport was intentionally offered to 
assist that person to evade criminal prosecution.  
Even though these added provisions are only of limited relevance to the above-
mentioned different types of piracy, the expansion of the definition of offences is 
noteworthy in order to understand the development and the approach of the convention in 
general. 
 
(ii) Remaining Shortcomings 
In contrast to the piracy definition of Article 101 UNCLOS, the SUA Convention 
provisions do not mention restrictive elements such as the commitment for private ends or 
the two ship requirement.135 Moreover, the geographical limits under the SUA Convention 
are not as narrow as under UNCLOS with its high seas requirement, as subject to Article 4 
the SUA Convention is applicable if the attacked vessel is navigating or is scheduled to 
navigate into, through or from waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single 
state, or the lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent states, without regard to where 
the actual attack took place. Unlike UNCLOS the SUA Convention is not restricted to 
offences committed on the high seas or in an exclusive economic zone. Therefore, the 
coverage of unlawful acts under the SUA Convention is basically larger than under 
                                                           
134 Cf. categorisation of new offences in Beckman (note 127) at 192. 
135 Treves (note 71) at 410. 
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UNCLOS.  
 
But the SUA Convention also has its own limitations. As previously mentioned 
Article 3 of the SUA Convention requires the perpetrator either to have seized or exercised 
‘control over the ship’ or to have performed an act of violence which has been ‘likely to 
endanger the safe navigation of that ship’. Accordingly, only the most violent but less 
frequent piratical acts such as kidnapping for ransom of a ship’s crew or hijacking of 
vessels are covered by the SUA Convention, whereas more frequent and slightly less 
violent piratical acts are not covered, as for instance simple acts of armed robbery by 
pirates in rubber boats who often only board the vessel for a very short moment.136 Also if 
crew members were injured in the latter scenario it would not necessarily mean that such 
an act of violence was already likely to endanger the safe navigation of the attacked ship.  
Likewise, an attempted boarding of a vessel does not constitute an offence under the SUA 
Convention unless the act itself can be characterised as an ‘act of violence’ although an 
attempted boarding can be equally dangerous to the safe navigation of the attacked ship 
due to defensive measures taken by the vessel’s crew to prevent the successful boarding.137  
 
For these reasons it is argued that no distinction should be made between attempted 
and actual boardings and that neither seizing or exercising control over a ship nor an act of 
violence which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the attacked ship should be 
necessary for the commitment of an offence under the SUA Convention.138 Otherwise not 
all different types of piracy as outlined above (see p. 5) would be subject to the SUA 
Convention. 
 
Altogether one has to bear in mind that the SUA Convention was adopted in order 
to remedy shortcomings of the UNCLOS piracy definition in respect of acts of maritime 
violence. Even though the defined offences under the SUA Convention may close some of 
these gaps, the convention does not serve as a universal remedy for combating piracy. 
 
(b) Rights and Obligations under the SUA Convention 
(i) Jurisdiction 
Regarding the jurisdiction for prosecution there has to be some kind of link between the 
                                                           
136 AJ Young & MJ Valencia ‘Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Rectitude and Utility’ 
(2003) 25(2) Contemporary Southeast Asia 269 at 277; Mejia & Mukherjee (note 14) at 184. 
137 Collins & Hassan (note 43) at 107. 
138 Beckman (note 17) at 322. 
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state willing to prosecute a person under the SUA Convention and the offence. Article 6(1) 
of the SUA Convention stipulates that a state is entitled to take measures and to establish 
jurisdiction over an offence when the offence is committed (a) against or on board a vessel 
flying its flag, or (b) in its territory including its territorial sea or (c) by a person who is its 
national. Thus, the number of states which can prosecute the offender is limited. The 
restrictions on states’ jurisdiction under the SUA Convention become even more evident 
when compared with the respective provisions under UNCLOS: as opposed to Article 105 
UNCLOS, according to which every state is entitled to prosecute pirates due to universal 
jurisdiction, the SUA Convention provides that only states which are party to the SUA 
Convention can prosecute offences under the treaty.139 
 
Provided that all states affected by an incident are party to the SUA Convention 
there are more detailed jurisdictional provisions which have to be mentioned. Subject to 
Article 7(1) of the SUA Convention, a signatory state shall take a person who allegedly 
committed an offence under the convention into custody as soon as the alleged offender 
enters its territory. Furthermore, after having taken the alleged offender into custody, 
Article 10 of the SUA Convention requires the signatory state to either extradite the person 
to another interested signatory state or to prosecute the person in its own courts. This 
obligation of the signatory state is referred to as the principle aut dedere aut iudicare.140 
Even in cases in which no extradition treaty between two signatory states exist the SUA 
Convention itself can serve as a legal basis for the extradition as stipulated in Article 11(2) 
of the SUA Convention. 
 
At a first glance these provisions appear as a strong and useful tool to prosecute and 
penalise offenders in order to avoid situations in which perpetrators go unpunished. 
However, the prosecution or extradition of offenders and consequently the enforcement of 
the SUA Convention are ultimately left to the each signatory state’s discretion.141 Owing to 
the lack of compulsion in the SUA Convention perpetrators will have impunity if for any 
reason the states concerned are unwilling to prosecute them because no other state will be 
able to step in and prosecute the perpetrators for their acts instead.142 In addition, the SUA 
Convention does not provide for any sanctions against signatory states which fail to 
                                                           
139 Skaridov (note 126) at 482. 
140 R Wolfrum ‘Fighting Terrorism at Sea: Options and Limitations under International Law’ in MH 
Nordquist et al. Legal Challenges in Maritime Security (2008) 3 at 17. 
141 Garmon (note 31) at 273. 
142 Ibid. 
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comply with their treaty obligations.143 
 
Lastly, it has to be pointed out that the SUA Convention also lacks uniformity just 
as UNCLOS does with regard to prosecution methods, legal proceedings and penalties 
imposed on perpetrators. Article 5 of the SUA Convention, for example, states that each 
signatory state are supposed to make the defined offences punishable by appropriate 
penalties which take the grave nature of those offences into account. In view of the fact 
that domestic laws frequently vary tremendously between different states, the SUA 
Convention has been severely criticised as the ‘[u]niformity in treatment of offenders by 
each state is important to ensure certainty of punishment’.144 
 
(ii) International Cooperation 
The SUA Convention contains several provisions which deal with the international 
cooperation among signatory states to prevent and suppress unlawful acts under the 
convention. In contrast to UNCLOS the obligations to cooperate are basically stipulated 
much more specifically. The wording indicates the importance of the provisions as the 
imperative was chosen, that is to say ‘shall’ is used as opposed to ‘should’.145 
 
Article 13(1) of the SUA Convention determines that signatory states must 
cooperate in the prevention of offences by taking all practicable measures to prevent 
preparations in their respective territories for the commission of those offences within or 
outside their territories. Additionally, signatory states are required to exchange information 
in accordance with their national law and to coordinate administrative and other measures 
considered as appropriate to prevent the commission of offences. Subject to Article 12 of 
the SUA Convention every state is also obliged to provide other states which are 
prosecuting an offender the greatest measure of assistance particularly in obtaining 
relevant evidence necessary for the criminal proceedings. 
 
On the one hand these strong obligations for signatory states facilitate an effective 
system of international cooperation but, on the other hand, they may also deter countries 
from ratifying the SUA Convention. As the example of Southeast Asian nations shows, 
especially countries with a recent colonial history, a comparatively newly won 
                                                           
143 Skaridov (note 126) at 483. 
144 Collins & Hassan (note 43) at 109. 
145 Mejia & Mukherjee (note 14) at 180. 
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independence and often with still not entirely unchallenged maritime boundaries are very 
reluctant to ratify the treaty. These countries are afraid that the strong obligations under the 
SUA Convention could be a serious compromise to their national sovereignty and that in 
the course of extending the convention’s scope the maritime forces of other signatory 
states could ultimately be allowed to pursue offenders in terms of the SUA Convention into 
their territorial waters in general.146 
 
Of further relevance to the cooperation between signatory states is the newly 
amended provision of Article 8bis of the 2005 SUA Protocol. The provision sets forth the 
conditions under which forces of a signatory state are allowed to board a vessel flying the 
flag of another signatory state when reasonable grounds exist that an offender in terms of 
the convention is on board. Thus, Article 8bis of the 2005 SUA Protocol establishes a new 
law enforcement mechanism as the provisions of the 1988 SUA Convention have not 
granted states powers to board vessels flying the flag of another signatory state and arrest 
offenders yet.147 
However, due to Article 8bis (5)(c) of the 2005 SUA Protocol the boarding of a 
vessel can only take place with the express authorisation of the flag state of the suspect 
vessel. The flag state may give its authorisation in general or ad hoc and may also impose 
specific conditions on the boarding state.148 Moreover, Article 8bis of the 2005 SUA 
Protocol restricts the use of force and includes several important safeguards for innocent 
seafarers, carriers and flag states when a signatory state takes action against a vessel.149 
 
(c) Interim Result 
In principle the SUA Convention can act as an additional useful tool to combat piracy. But 
in view of the fact that above all the SUA Convention was adopted to remedy 
shortcomings of the UNCLOS piracy provisions it has to be noted that this goal has only 
been achieved to a limited extent. 
 
The most serious problem of the SUA Convention regime consists in the circumstance that 
its effectiveness depends on its widespread regional ratification which is still pending in  
                                                           
146 Young & Valencia (note 136) at 277. 
147 Beckman (note 127) at 189 and 194.  
148 Tuerk (note 48) at 361. 
149 See Article 8bis (8) to (10) of the 2005 SUA Protocol for more detailed information with regard to 
safeguards. 
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most regions with hot spots of piracy.150 Consequently, states which are obliged to 
cooperate in combating piracy outside their territorial waters under UNCLOS do not have 
such an obligation within their own territory unless they have become party to the SUA 
Convention. But even if a state has ratified the SUA Convention the prosecution or 
extradition of offenders are still subject to the state’s discretion. In the absence of any 
enforcement and sanction mechanism the offenders may have impunity if signatory states 
fail to comply with their treaty obligations and in that case the basic idea of the SUA 
Convention to eliminate safe havens for offenders would dilute significantly. 
 
Furthermore, the scope of the SUA Convention is restricted to the most serious 
piratical acts as mentioned above. Moreover, the newly amended boarding provisions 
which require that every suspect vessel can only be boarded with the express consent of the 
flag state show the reluctance of the international community ‘to create new exceptions to 
the principle of flag state jurisdiction on the high seas’.151 Thus, effective cooperation 
under the SUA Convention will only take place among states with common interests. 
 
Concerning the hot spot of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden 
the current usefulness of the SUA Convention is very limited because Somalia has not 
become a party to the convention yet. Even if the TFG formally ratified the SUA 
Convention in the near future despite the political instability, the TFG would not be able to 
apply and enforce its provisions due to its inability to control the Somali coast. The 
frequently quite serious attacks of Somali pirates however regularly meet the requirements 
to constitute an offence in terms of the SUA Convention. 
 
IV. Defining Piracy Beyond UCLOS and the SUA Convention 
It has become apparent that neither UNCLOS nor the SUA Convention provides a legal 
definition which covers all contemporary piratical attacks comprehensively. Xu comments 
that ‘a particular kind of criminal conduct at sea may be considered as piracy according to 
its dictionary meaning, but may not squarely fall within a legal definition of piracy’.152 
Nonetheless, several further attempts have been made to clarify that issue. 
 
The IMO distinguishes according to the geographical occurrence of a piratical act. 
                                                           
150 Further information on the current status of ratifications are available at the IMO website, see 
http://www.imo.org/conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=248 [Accessed 13.12.2009]. 
151 Beckman (note 127) at 197. 
152 Xu (note 16) at 640. 
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If an incident takes place on the high seas (or in the exclusive economic zone) the IMO 
refers to the piracy definition of Article 101 UNCLOS whereas incidents occurring in the 
territorial waters of a littoral state are regarded as so-called ‘armed robbery against ships’. 
In its Draft Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships the IMO defined ‘armed robbery against ships’ as any unlawful act 
of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of 
‘piracy’, directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such ship, within a 
state’s jurisdiction over such offences.153 Thus, an offence in terms of the IMO can be 
described as the UNCLOS definition of piracy without the high seas limitation.154 It is 
noteworthy though that so far this definition has only been used in non-treaty IMO 
documents.155 
 
Meijia & Mukherjee follow a very similar approach, also making a distinction 
between piracy in terms of UNCLOS occurring on the high seas on the one hand and the 
so-called ‘coastal zone piracy’ on the other hand which is almost identically defined as 
IMO’s term ‘armed robbery against ships’.156 
 
The probably most extensive definition is used by the IMB which determines piracy 
as an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit 
theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the 
furtherance of that act.157 
 
Whichever of these approaches one may prefer it has to be emphasised that the 
theoretical determination of which unlawful acts can be regarded as piratical attacks may 
be useful for statistical purposes but that it does not automatically assist in combating 
piracy in practice. Only an amendment to the international legal framework against piracy 
with regard to the defined offences can extend the scope and increase the effectiveness of 
the international anti-piracy regime. 
                                                           
153 IMO ‘Draft Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
Ships’ MSC/Circ.984 (20.12.2000) at 2.2 in Annex, available at 
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D1880/984.pdf [Accessed 27.01.2010]. 
154 Cf. Collins & Hassan (note 43) at 110. 
155 H Fouché Policing Piracy and Armed Robbery of Ships in South Africa’s Territorial Waters and 
Contiguous Zone (2006) at 43, doctoral dissertation, available at 
http://libserv5.tut.ac.za:7780/pls/eres/wpg_docload.download_file?p_filename=F626643704/fouche.pdf 
[Accessed 27.01.2010]. 
156 Mejia & Mukherjee (note 14) at 183. 
157 See IMB Piracy Report for the period 1 January - 30 September 2009 (note 12), p. 23. 
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V. International Ship and Port Facility Security Code 
The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code is an amendment to the 
1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). In response to the 
perceived threats to ships and port facilities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United 
States the ISPS Code was adopted in December 2002 under the auspices of the IMO, 
implemented through Chapter XI-2 ‘Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security’ in 
SOLAS and entered into force in July 2004.158 Similar to the SUA Convention, the ISPS 
Code is in the first place also regarded as a tool to combat maritime terrorism.159 
 
The priority objective of the ISPS Code is ‘to establish an international framework 
involving cooperation between contracting governments, government agencies, local 
administrations and the shipping and port industries to detect security threats and take 
preventive measures against security incidents affecting ship or port facilities used in 
international trade’.160 The ISPS Code consists of two parts, one is mandatory (Part A) and 
the other one recommendatory (Part B). Part A contains detailed security-related 
requirements for governments, port authorities and shipping companies which have to be 
met, while Part B provides a series of guidelines about how to comply with these 
requirements. 
 
The decisive question is whether the ISPS Code sustainably enhanced the 
international framework against piracy, particularly in the hot spot off the coast of 
Somalia. Accordingly, it has to be clarified when measures in terms of the ISPS Code can 
be taken. All preventive and procedural measures subject to the ISPS Code are designed to 
protect ship and port facilities against a ‘security incident’ which is defined in Regulation 1 
of SOLAS XI-2 as ‘any suspicious act or circumstance threatening the security of a ship, 
including a mobile offshore drilling unit or a high-speed craft, or of a port facility or of any 
ship/port interface or any ship-to-ship activity’.161  
 
Due to its broadness and vagueness this definition appears to be rather inadequate 
and not very useful concerning combating piracy in hot spots like off the coast of Somalia. 
                                                           
158 With regard to the emergence of the ISPS Code see 
http://www.imo.org/Safety/mainframe.asp?topic_id=897#what [Accessed 07.02.2010]. 
159 Mejia & Mukherjee (note 14) at 173. 
160 See IMO publication available at 
http://www.imo.org/newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=583&doc_id=2435 [Accessed 07.02.2010]. 
161 The SOLAS/ISPS Code definition of ‘security incident’ is cited in M Mejia ‘The ISPS Code, Security 
Culture, and the Campaign against Piracy and Other Crimes at Sea’ (2009) 104(4) BIMCO Bulletin 42 at 43. 
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As regards the fight against terrorism, however, it has to be admitted that at least so far no 
incidents ‘of maritime attacks using ships as weapons or explosives, or of ships being 
taken over by terrorists embarking from shore-side’ have occurred since the ISPS Code’s 
entry into force.162 
 
But the ISPS Code also faces more precise criticism from maritime practitioners. 
Andrew Linington, spokesman of the UK officer’s union Nautilus UK, states: ‘The ISPS 
Code has done a lot for raising awareness of security but our members are still asking what 
good is it really doing. It is clearly not working when half-a-dozen men can gain access to 
a ship like the 318,000-dwt Sirius Star (built 2008) with knives and guns. It is high time we 
sat down and revised the code in the light of these attacks’.163 The union Nautilus UK is of 
the opinion that the key failing of the ISPS Code consists in introducing additional 
responsibilities without requiring extra specialist on-board personnel.164 
Moreover, others criticise more generally that the ISPS Code did nothing to address the 
issue of piracy and other criminal actions aimed at ships that the industry had been 
complaining about for years, but that it is only another financial burden which 
shipoperators have to shoulder.165 
 
Currently, the ISPS Code’s effective contribution to combating piracy is still very 
limited in hot spots like off the Somali coast.166 Many piratical attacks are not clearly 
addressed, different in nature and not covered by the ISPS Code. 
 
VI. United ations Security Council Resolutions on Somalia 
The currently very serious and precarious situation of numerous pirate activities off the 
coast of Somalia is due to both the political instability facilitating piratical attacks which in 
turn exacerbate the situation in Somalia in general and the shortcomings of the 
international conventions in combating piracy. Aware of these problems, the international 
community made numerous efforts to improve the situation by passing several United 
                                                           
162 Mejia (note 161) at 43-4. 
163 Cited in ‘Nautilus UK says ISPS Code Fails to Protect Seafarers from Piracy’ Tradewinds (23.01.2009), 
available on request at www.tradewinds.no. 
164 Ibid. 
165 See ‘Good on Paper: The Spate of Somalian [sic] Piracy Attacks Has Highlighted the Flaws in ISPS and 
Justified the Initial Reaction of the Sceptics When the System Was Mooted’ Comment in Fairplay Solutions 
(04.12.2009), available on request at www.fairplay.co.uk.  
166 Similar assessments with regard to issues of piracy have also been stated by Captain B Watt in his speech 
(‘The ISPS Code as an Instrument against Piracy and Piracy and Other Crimes at Sea’) at the Combating and 
Preventing Sea Piracy in Africa Summit 2009, Cape Town, 26 - 28 August 2009. 
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Nations Security Council resolutions as will be outlined below.167  
 
1. Practical Problems to Combat Piracy off the Somali coast 
The legal situation under international law serves as a starting point. Accordingly, if a 
piratical attack occurs in the territorial waters of a littoral state, the only state which is 
entitled to seize the attacking vessel and to arrest the offenders is the littoral state unless 
the littoral state has expressly authorised another state to exercise police power in its 
territorial waters.168 Somalia, however, is unable to properly police and maintain the 
security of its own territorial waters whereas international naval forces do not have the 
right to take anti-piracy measures within the Somali territorial waters. Consequently, 
Somali pirates often escape punishment because they regularly attack vessels either within 
the Somali territorial waters or if the attack occurs on the high seas they are frequently able 
to evade pursuit by crossing into Somalia’s territorial waters. 
 
2. Key elements of the Security Council Resolutions 
In order to remedy the limitations and broaden the scope of the rules of international law 
on piracy the Security Council adopted Resolutions 1816, 1838, 1846 and 1851 in 2008 
and Resolution 1897 in 2009. Collectively these resolutions are regarded as ‘the most 
comprehensive piracy repression guidance promulgated by the UN in their history’.169 All 
of them were decided under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.170 Thus, the 
resolutions are legally binding for all states.171 
 
First of all the Security Council passed Resolution 1816 in June 2008, stating that 
the Security Council was gravely concerned by the threat that acts of piracy and armed 
robbery against vessels pose to the prompt, safe and effective delivery of humanitarian aid 
to Somalia, the safety of commercial maritime routes and to international navigation.172 
These concerns were especially deepened because of hijackings of vessels operated by the 
                                                           
167 It can be distinguished between resolutions addressing generally the issues of peace, stability and security 
in Somalia such as SC Res. 1814 and 1844 and resolutions dealing with Somali piracy in detail such as 
SC Res. 1816, 1838, 1846, 1851 and 1897. 
168 Beckman (note 17) at 327. 
169 Kraska & Wilson (note 34) at 50. 
170 The full text of the Charter of the United Nations including Chapter VII is available at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml [Accessed 06.02.2010]. 
171 Cf. M Herdegen Völkerrecht 8th (2009) at 286-7; Keyuan (note 81) further states to the legal status at 336: 
‘Unlike resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly, resolutions passed by the UNSC, particularly those 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, have legal effect and, when the term “decide” is used, they contain the 
highest degree of compelling binding force’. 
172 See full text of the SC Res. 1816 at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9344.doc.htm [Accessed 
06.02.2010]. 
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United Nations World Food Programme and the inability of Somali authorities to act 
against the hijackers.173 In this context it has to be pointed out that not piracy and armed 
robbery as such constitute a threat to international peace and security in terms of 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Exacerbated by pirate activities in the territorial 
waters of Somalia and on the high seas off the Somali coast it is rather the situation in 
Somalia as a whole which amounts to a case of Chapter VII.174 
 
The key provision of all resolutions is to be found in paragraph 7 of Resolution 
1816 providing that states which cooperate with the TFG in the fight against piracy and 
armed robbery at sea off the Somali coast may (a) enter the territorial waters of Somalia for 
the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea and may for that reason 
(b) use ‘all necessary means’ within the territorial waters of Somalia, in a manner 
consistent with action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy and under relevant 
international law. Also worth mentioning is the fact that Resolution 1816 and the 
subsequent resolutions of the Security Council were adopted on the basis of the TFG’s 
authorisation as stated in paragraph 9 of Resolution 1816. It is argued that the significance 
given to the TFG’s consent has the objective of respecting state sovereignty and 
strengthening the TFG in general.175 
 
Additionally, in Resolution 1846 the Security Council called upon all states, more 
precisely flag, port and coastal states, states of the nationality of victims and perpetrators of 
piratical acts and other states with relevant jurisdiction under international law and national 
legislation, to cooperate in determining jurisdiction and in investigating and prosecuting 
persons responsible for such piratical acts off the Somali coast and in assisting one 
another.176 In this respect Resolution 1846 also urges states to fully implement their 
obligations under the SUA Convention provided that they are already party to the 
convention.177 
 
Resolution 1851 broadens the scope of action for international naval forces. 
Paragraph 6 stipulates that authorised states may undertake all necessary measures that are 
                                                           
173 For more information on the United Nations World Food Programme in Somalia see 
http://www.wfp.org/countries/Somalia [06.02.2010]. 
174 Guilfoyle (note 82) at 695. 
175 Treves (note 71) at 407. 
176 See paragraph 14 of the SC Res. 1846, available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9514.doc.htm [Accessed 06.02.2010]. 
177 Ibid at paragraph 15. 
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appropriate ‘in Somalia’ for the purpose of suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at 
sea, i.e. states are entitled to use land-based operations on Somali soil.178 Arguably, this 
extension is owed to the Le Ponant incident in April 2008 when French forces pursued 
pirates who had taken crew members of a French luxury yacht hostage for ransom into the 
Somali mainland.179 
 
Furthermore, the Security Council argues in support of embarked law enforcement 
officials, also referred to as ‘shipriders’. In paragraph 3 of Resolution 1851 the Security 
Council invites all states combating piracy off the Somali coast to conclude special 
agreements or arrangements with countries willing to take custody of pirates in order to 
embark shipriders from the latter countries, in particular countries in the region, to 
facilitate the investigation and prosecution of persons detained as a result of operations 
conducted under the Resolution. However, this form of cooperation requires that the TFG 
has consented to the exercise of third state jurisdiction by shipriders in territorial waters of 
Somalia in advance and that suchlike special agreements or arrangements do not negatively 
affect the implementation of the SUA Convention. 
 
Given the inability of the state of Somalia to prevent piratical activities and to 
patrol and secure its territorial waters the resolutions of the Security Council offer a new 
tool for international naval forces to effectively repress piracy off the Somali coast, 
particularly in cases of hot pursuit from the high seas into the territorial waters of Somalia. 
However, also the resolutions are restricted in some respect. 
 
Firstly, the authorisation is temporarily limited. Resolution 1816 passed on 2 June 
2008 was valid for six months. Accordingly, it was renewed on 2 December 2008 by 
Resolution 1846 for twelve further months which in turn was lastly prolonged on 
30 November 2009 by Resolution 1897 for additional twelve months. The latter renewal 
also applies to land-based operations in terms of Resolution 1851.180 
 
Secondly, the scope of the resolutions is locally restricted. The authorisation 
provided only applies to the situation in Somalia, that is to say that international naval 
                                                           
178 See full text of the SC Res. 1851 at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9541.doc.htm [Accessed 
07.02.2010]. 
179 Cf. Treves (note 71) at 404. 
180 See particularly SC Res. 1897 at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9799.doc.htm [Accessed 
07.02.2010]. 
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forces taking anti-piracy measures are only allowed to enter the territorial waters of 
Somalia but not of other adjacent states such as Kenya or Yemen unless these states have 
expressly given their consent.181 
 
Thirdly, it is stressed in paragraph 8 of Resolution 1897 that the renewed 
authorisations are not to be regarded as establishing customary international law. The 
authorisations shall not affect the rights, obligations or responsibility of states under 
international law, including any rights or obligations under UNCLOS with respect to any 
other situation. 
 
Fourthly, the Security Council notes that activities undertaken by cooperating states 
pursuant to the authorisations shall not have practical effects of denying or impairing the 
right of innocent passage to the vessels of any third state.182  
 
3. EUAVFOR Somalia (Operation Atalanta) and Combined Task Force 151 
Related to the Security Council resolutions, certain military operations which have been 
launched to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia have to be mentioned, namely the 
EUNAVFOR Somalia – better known as Operation Atalanta – and the Combined Task 
Force 151 (CTF 151). 
 
 Operation Atalanta was established by the Council of the European Union in 
November 2008 and is a military operation in support of the United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838, 1846 and 1897. Its objectives are to contribute to: 
 
 the protection of vessels of the United Nations World Food Programme delivering 
food aid to displaced persons in Somalia; 
 the protection of vulnerable vessels sailing in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali 
coast; 
 the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off 
the Somali coast. 
 
 This first maritime operation of the European Union aims at effective cooperation 
with other naval forces and assets deployed in the region in order to improve the situation 
                                                           
181 Cf. wording of paragraph 9 of the SC Res. 1816 (note 172). 
182 See paragraph 10 of the SC Res. 1897 (note 180). 
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off the coast of Somalia.183 
 
 The CTF 151 is a multinational task force established in January 2009 to conduct 
anti-piracy operations to actively deter, disrupt and suppress piracy in order to protect 
global maritime security and secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations. 
After having previously been commanded by the U.S. Navy and the Turkish Navy, 
currently the command staff is comprised of personnel from a number coalition 
countries.184 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
183 More information on Operation Atalanta is available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1518&lang=en [Accessed 07.02.2010]. 
184 More information on CTF 151 is available at http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/cmf/151/index.html [Accessed 
07.02.2010]. 
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CHAPTER 4: International Cooperation to Combat Piracy 
 
International cooperation to combat piracy can be divided into two different types of 
cooperation which have to be distinguished. On the one hand international cooperation is 
carried out by private companies and non-governmental organisations, in particular by the 
IMB and the Comité Maritime International (CMI). On the other hand international 
cooperation is also to be found under the umbrella of countries and government-based 
international organisations, for instance in the form of agreements and collective acts 
performed by various countries or under the auspices of the IMO.185 In the following these 
different types of international cooperation which have been undertaken so far to combat 
piracy will be outlined and examined. 
 
I. Cooperation between Private Companies and Organisations 
1. International Maritime Bureau – Piracy Reporting Centre 
Piracy at sea remains a serious threat to maritime commerce. In response to an increasing 
level of piracy the IMB which is a specialised division of the International Chamber of 
Commerce decided to established the 24 hour Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia, in October 1992. 
 The PRC’s main objective is to be the first point of contact for the master of a ship 
to report an actual or attempted attack or even suspicious movements and thus initiating the 
process of response. Furthermore, the PRC aims at raising awareness within the shipping 
industry – including shipmasters, shipowners, insurance companies and traders – of the 
areas of high risk associated with piratical attacks. In an attempt to counter piratical attacks 
in an ideal way the PRC closely cooperates with the industry, various governments and law 
enforcement agencies and shares information in a transparent and open manner.186 
 
 The key services of the PRC are: 
 
 issuing daily status reports on piracy and armed robbery to ships via broadcasts on 
the Inmarsat-C SafetyNET service; 
 reporting piracy and armed robbery at sea incidents to law enforcement and the 
IMO; 
 helping local law enforcement apprehend pirates and assist in bringing them to 
                                                           
185 Mo (note 25) at 347. 
186 Further information on the background of the PRC is available at http://www.icc-
ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=30&Itemid=12 [Accessed 08.02.2010]. 
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justice; 
 assisting and advising shipowners, shipmasters and crew members whose vessels 
have been attacked; 
 providing updates on worldwide pirate activity via the Internet; 
 publishing comprehensive quarterly and annual reports with detailed piracy 
statistics.187 
 
 Apart from its reporting function the PRC has considerably contributed to the 
increased ‘public awareness of the real danger and risk of modern maritime piracy’.188 Due 
to the status of the IMB as an independent non-governmental institution, it is widely 
accepted by the shipping industry, a fact which simplifies cooperation. Thus, shipowners 
and shipmasters rather report incidents to the PRC than to authorities of coastal states 
because otherwise they fear that for instance the authorities’ investigations may delay their 
voyage.189 
 
 At present the PRC of the IMB can be regarded as the only international body 
which renders immediate, practical and unconditional assistance to seafarers who fall 
victim to maritime piracy anywhere in the world. 
 
2. Comité Maritime International – Model Law 
In addition to the work of the IMB, the major international cooperation of private 
companies and organisations is carried out by the Comité Maritime International (CMI). 
The CMI was formally established as a non-governmental organisation, located in 
Antwerp, Belgium, in 1897 and is regarded as the first international organisation in the 
maritime field which dealt exclusively with maritime law and related commercial 
practices.190 Its main objective ‘is to contribute by all appropriate means and activities to 
the unification of maritime law in all its aspects’.191 
 
(a) Model ational Law 
Apart from the CMI’s contribution to combat piracy by organising studies and conferences 
                                                           
187 More detailed information on all provided services by the PRC is available at http://www.icc-
ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=31&Itemid=37 [Accessed 08.02.2010]. 
188 Mo (note 25) at 348. 
189 Beckman (note 17) at 332. 
190 For more detailed information on the historical background of the CMI see 
http://www.comitemaritime.org/histo/his.html [Accessed 13.02.2010]. 
191 See http://www.comitemaritime.org [Accessed 13.02.2010]. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
LL.M. THESIS – THORSTE RESCH (UIVERSITY OF CAPE TOW) 
 49
dealing with modern-day issues of shipping law to raise public awareness of the danger 
and risk of maritime piracy, the CMI’s major efforts consist in drafting a model law 
responding to piracy.192 In 1997 the CMI invited several relevant international 
organisations to join together in examining the exacerbating situation of maritime piracy 
and ultimately the Joint International Working Group (JIWG) was formed. The JIWG 
consists of representatives from the following international organisations in addition to the 
CMI: 
 
 the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO); 
 the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS); 
 the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL); 
 the International Group of P&I Clubs (IGP&I); 
 the IMB; 
 the IMO; 
 the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF); 
 the International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI); 
 the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, Division for Oceans Affairs and 
the Law of the Sea (UNOLA/DOALOS). 
 
 There was early agreement among the participants that the JIWG would focus on 
issues of jurisdiction and prosecution of the crimes of piracy and maritime violence. The 
JIWG noted that a fundamental difficulty in combating piracy with effective counter 
measures is due to the lack of uniformity in national laws concerning acts of piracy and 
maritime violence. As the legal inability to effectively prosecute pirates had become 
apparent in several cases in the past, for instance in the Alondra Rainbow incident in 1999, 
the JIWG stressed the need for a Model National Law which was to be drafted.193 Finally, 
the Model National Law on Acts of Piracy and Maritime Violence (Model National Law) 
was completed in 2001. 
 
 The priority objective of the Model National Law was ‘to ensure that no act of 
piracy or maritime violence falls outside the jurisdiction of affected states to prosecute and 
                                                           
192 Mo (note 25) at 348. 
193 See Keyuan (note 81) at 344 outlining the Alondra Rainbow incident in more detail: ‘the Mumbai High 
Court overruled the lower court’s decision and acquitted all the accused’. 
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punish these crimes or, alternatively, to extradite for prosecution in another state’.194 
Moreover, the draft was supposed to assist in giving full effect to the UNCLOS piracy 
provisions as well as the relevant provisions under the SUA Convention. Furthermore, it 
aimed at the uniform application of provisions of the SUA Convention as national law in 
those states which had not become parties to the convention by then. Additionally, the draft 
Model National Law sought to make sure that all incidents of piracy and maritime violence 
covered by its definitions would be reported to the proper national authorities and that the 
information would be passed on to the competent international organisations.195 
 
(b) Status of Adoption of the Model ational Law by Governments 
Although the proposed draft Model National Law was adopted by the CMI Assembly and 
subsequently distributed to the national member associations of the CMI, the ultimate goal 
of lobbying national governments for enactment of the text as national law was only 
reached to a very small extent.196 Several different reasons for the missing support for the 
Model National Law have been adduced.  
 
 Firstly, the draft was criticised for not covering certain types of crimes. Particularly, 
questions arose in respect of the draft’s ‘application of jurisdiction over and its 
effectiveness at ensuring the prosecution of perpetrators of criminal offenses committed on 
board foreign-flagged ships’, e.g. ships which are flagged under a state other than the state 
responding to the offense.197 
 
 Secondly, despite the increasing number of piratical incidents there was still a 
general lack of awareness by many national governments in how far they had actually 
already been affected by these matters. Consequently, several governments did not realise 
that the Model National Law could serve as a useful remedy.198 
 
 Thirdly, it is also argued that the problem of piracy and maritime violence was of 
                                                           
194 See ‘Report of the Joint International Working Group’ in CMI Yearbook 2000, available at 
http://www.comitemaritime.org/singapore/piracy/piracy_report.html [Accessed 14.02.2010]. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Fouché (note 155) at 39 notes that Canada and New Zealand are the only countries so far which have 
adopted measures in their national criminal codes criminalising piracy in accordance with the CMI Model 
National Law. 
197 Gabel (note 15) at 1448; at 1449 the cited author makes further remarks to the Tajima incident which was 
widely acknowledged as an example of such a situation to which the Model National Law could not provide 
a remedy. 
198 Cf. Hitt (note 27). 
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too little significance in financial terms to become a priority for the industry.199 
 
 Fourthly, in retrospect the initial presentation of the draft in 2001 took place at 
quite an unfortunate time because ‘effective action was simply overtaken by events 
following 9/11 and the focus on producing the ISPS Code’.200 
 
 Against the backdrop of these circumstances and criticism the JIWG was engaged 
with the revision of the draft. Improvement suggestions for the draft were made by 
representatives of the participating organisations with regard to the range of the draft’s 
definitions, particularly addressing the increasing problem of violent kidnappings for 
ransom from ships at sea predominantly committed in waters of littoral states lacking 
effective governmental structures and law enforcement capabilities.201 It was also proposed 
that any revised work should include criminal acts on foreign-flagged ships. Furthermore, 
the whole revision was to take the altered situation after the 9/11 attacks into account, 
considering an emerging linkage between piracy and terrorism. Apart from these 
substantive revisions in the text of the draft, it was also emphasised that a ‘revised Model 
National Law would need a better promotion’ in order to explain why such a model is 
necessary to actually be successful.202 
 
(c) Draft Guidelines for ational Legislation 
Resulting from further deliberations of the JIWG with regard to the above-mentioned 
issues the Draft Guidelines for National Legislation (Draft Guidelines) were finally 
completed in 2007, replacing the initially drafted Model National Law in an attempt to 
diminish the limitations of the latter. 
 
The Draft Guidelines are designed to apply to a broad range of maritime crimes including 
but not limited to homicide, bodily harm, piracy, armed robbery, extortion, serious fraud, 
kidnapping by deception, acts of terrorism and facilitation of proliferation of weapons of 
                                                           
199 See Minutes of the Assembly held at the Automobile Club de France in Paris (16.04.2005), CMI News 
Letter No. 2 May/August 2005 at 9, available at http://www.comitemaritime.org/news/pdfiles/2005-2.pdf 
[Accessed 14.02.2010]. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid at 8-9. 
202 Ibid at 9. 
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mass destruction.203 With regard to piratical acts the wide spectrum of criminal offences is 
intended to complement the non-exhaustive piracy provisions of UNCLOS and the 
offences under the SUA Convention.204 Thus, further ‘maritime criminal acts’ are defined 
in addition to already existing offences of piracy under international law.205 
 
 The JIWG admits that the majority of these criminal act fall under national 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of various states.206 Concerning the issue of 
jurisdiction and prosecution the Draft Guidelines provide an extensive right to prosecute 
‘in the state apprehending or having custody of a person accused of committing an 
offence’, ‘when the person accused … is a citizen or national of the enacting state, or is a 
resident or foreign national, or is a stateless person’, ‘when an offence … is committed 
against a person who is a citizen or national of, or is a foreign national resident in the 
enacting state, or is a stateless person’ and ‘when an offence … is committed on board a 
foreign-flag ship’ (and certain requirements are met).207 
 
 The JIWG is of the opinion that ‘the key to effective prosecution of these crimes … 
is a high degree of uniformity in national legislation and the consequent elimination of 
conflicts of law which pose barriers to jurisdiction, apprehension, collection and admission 
of evidence, retention in custody, extradition and/or trial, and upon determination of guilt, 
sentencing to reasonably equivalent and proportionately severe penalties’.208 Although no 
specific penalties are proposed in the Draft Guidelines, states are to determine penalties 
severe enough to discourage the commitment of maritime criminal acts. Moreover, the 
JIWG acknowledges that national governments have the greatest knowledge of their own 
national circumstances of maritime crime and should therefore focus on individual needs 
when reviewing their national criminal law in the light of the Draft Guidelines. 
 
 Ultimately, not the provided form of the Draft Guidelines is decisive but the 
implementation of the Draft Guidelines’ contents into national legislation is of utmost 
                                                           
203 See all covered maritime criminal acts including acts of piracy in Article I of the Draft Guidelines for 
National Legislation, available at http://www.comitemaritime.org/cmidocs/pdf/Crim_acts.pdf [Accessed 
15.02.2010]. 
204 Cf. Mejia & Mukherjee (note 43) at 322. 
205 See Article I(3) of the Draft Guidelines (note 203) referring to the Convention on the High Seas and 
UNCLOS; Article I(4) refers to acts of piracy under national criminal codes and under applicable customary 
international law. 
206 See Introduction to the Draft Guidelines for National Legislation (note 203). 
207 Article II(3) - (6) of the Draft Guidelines. 
208 See the Introduction to the Draft Guidelines (note 203). 
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importance.209 
 
(d) Interim Result 
The newly developed Draft Guidelines can generally serve as a useful tool which 
substantially improves the international maritime community’s response to piracy. 
 
 Bearing in mind that pirates only operate at sea to commit their crimes but 
eventually have to come ashore to dispose of their gains, collective action by national law 
enforcement can be utilised to take advantage of this potential weakness of pirates.210 
However, the success of the Draft Guidelines will be highly dependent on the support of all 
member organisations of the JIWG and finally on the willingness of national governments 
to contribute and implement the Draft Guidelines into national legislation. 
 
 It is argued that the key feature of any developed model law consists in the ‘lack of 
binding force’.211 On the one hand a model law brings along the advantage that states have 
some liberty in determining how to draft their own national anti-piracy laws. On the other 
hand the disadvantage is that no effective anti-piracy regime can be established if not all 
states concerned implement the model law as no legal obligation exists to adopt it.212 
 
II. Cooperation between Countries – Government-based Organisations 
As regards cooperation and collective acts performed by countries and government-based 
international organisations the geographical scope of cooperation can be distinguished. 
While the IMO as a specialised organisation within the United Nations basically works on 
an international level, the cooperation can also take place on a regional level as for instance 
in Southeast Asia including a number of neighbouring countries. In the latter case the 
question arises in how far regional concepts of successful cooperation can be replicated in 
other areas in the world with similar problems with regard to piracy. 
 
1. Cooperation on an International Level – Efforts of the IMO 
The IMO is a specialised organisation within the United Nations with 169 member states. 
                                                           
209 Ibid. 
210 Gabel (note 15) at 1453. 
211 Mo (note 25) at 353. 
212 Ibid, also noting that if a model law was backed by an obligation to adopt it, it would be problematic how 
to make all states accept such an obligation because no state could be compelled to accept such an obligation 
if it did not wish to do so – similar to the conclusion of international treaties. 
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It has the mandate to develop and maintain a comprehensive regulatory framework for 
shipping, including safety, environmental concerns, legal matters, technical cooperation, 
maritime security and the efficiency of shipping.213 
 
 With regard to piracy in general the IMO has made considerable efforts in many 
respects to address the problem and to raise public awareness of the danger and risk of 
maritime piracy these days. Besides issuing monthly piracy reports the IMO carries out 
research and studies on piracy control. Accordingly, already in December 2000 the IMO 
developed the Draft Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and 
Armed Robbery against Ships.214 Furthermore, the IMO issued inter alia two documents 
on the subject of preventing and suppressing piracy entitled ‘Recommendations to 
Governments for Preventing and Suppressing Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships’ 
and ‘Guidance to Shipowners and Ship Operators, Shipmasters and Crews on Preventing 
and Suppressing Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships’.215 
 
 In respect of piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of 
Somalia the IMO published the ‘Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy in the Gulf of 
Aden and off the Coast of Somalia Developed by the Industry’ at the request of the ICS.216 
Additionally, the IMO gave advice to mariners and disseminated the circular ‘Information 
on Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) for Ships Transiting the Gulf of 
Aden’.217 
 
 Moreover, the IMO makes efforts to promote international action to stabilise the 
situation in Somalia through the United Nations, more precisely through the Security 
Council (see p. 41), the Political Office for Somalia, the Development Programme, the 
Contact Group on Piracy off Somalia and others.218 
                                                           
213 More detailed information on the general work of the IMO can be found at http://www.imo.org/ 
[Accessed 15.02.2010]. 
214 MSC/Circ.984 (20.12.2000), available at 
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D1880/984.pdf [Accessed 19.02.2010]. 
215 MSC.1/Circ.1333 (26.06.2009), available at 
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D25884/1333.pdf [Accessed 19.02.2010] and 
MSC.1/Circ.1334 (23.06.2009), available at 
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D25885/1334.pdf [Accessed 19.02.2010]. 
216 MSC.1/Circ.1335 (29.09.2009), available at 
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D26641/1335.pdf [Accessed 19.02.2010]. 
217 SN.1/Circ.281 (03.08.2009), available at 
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D26208/281.pdf [Accessed 19.02.2010]. 
218 See IMO website at http://www.imo.org/Facilitation/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1178 [Accessed 
19.02.2010]. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
LL.M. THESIS – THORSTE RESCH (UIVERSITY OF CAPE TOW) 
 55
2. Cooperation on a Regional Level 
The best-known example of cooperation on a regional level is the Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). 
Due to the decrease of piratical attacks in Southeast Asia and particularly in the Strait of 
Malacca ReCAAP is deemed to be the most successful regional cooperation among 
states.219 Hence, ReCAAP’s structure and approach will be outlined and examined. 
Subsequently, the question will be raised whether ReCAAP can be replicated in the hot 
spot of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Finally, the option of establishing regional piracy 
courts complementing other efforts of regional cooperation will be discussed. 
 
(a) Regional Cooperation Using the Example of ReCAAP  
In November 2004, after four years of negotiations ReCAAP was adopted by 16 states of 
Southeast Asia including Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand 
and Vietnam. The agreement which had been initiated by Japan entered into force in 
September 2006 when it received ten ratifications. Being the first government-to-
government agreement that addresses the incidence of piracy and armed robbery in Asia, 
ReCAAP aims to enhance multilateral cooperation among the contracting parties.220 
 
(i) Offences under ReCAAP 
First of all, the extent of piratical activities which is targeted by ReCAAP has to be 
determined. According to the wording of the agreement and just like the IMO, ReCAAP 
uses the UNCLOS definition of piracy and additionally includes the offence of ‘armed 
robbery against ships’ as stated in the IMO’s Draft Code of Practice for the Investigation 
of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships.221 Thus, an offence in terms of 
ReCAAP can be described as the UNCLOS definition of piracy without the high seas 
limitation.222 
 
                                                           
219 In the Strait of Malacca which had been the most endangered area in a global comparison for a significant 
period of time the number of attacks per year has halved between 2005 and 2008 from 82 to 41 attacks, 
tending to become even less in 2009; see IMB Piracy Report for the period 1 January - 30 September 2009 
(note 12). 
220 See general information on ReCAAP at http://www.recaap.org/index_home.html [16.02.2010]. 
221 The definition provided in Article 1 ReCAAP is identically equal to Article 101 UNCLOS and the 
definition of ‘armed robbery against ships’ in the IMO Draft Code of Practice (note 153); the full text of 
ReCAAP is available at http://www.recaap.org/about/pdf/ReCAAP%20Agreement.pdf [16.02.2010]. 
222 Collins & Hassan (note 43) at 110. 
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(ii) Obligations and Mechanisms for Cooperation 
For the purpose of effectively combating piracy and armed robbery against ships ReCAAP 
comprises several obligations for contracting parties and focuses on mechanisms for 
cooperation. 
 
 One of the central provisions of ReCAAP is to be found in Article 3(1) which 
provides that the contracting parties are obliged to take effective measures (a) to prevent 
and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships, (b) to arrest pirates or persons who 
have committed armed robbery against ships, (c) to seize ships or aircraft used for 
committing piracy or armed robbery against ships and (d) to rescue victim ships and 
victims of piracy or armed robbery against ships. 
 Article 2(1) ReCAAP further stipulates the implementation of ReCAAP ‘to the 
fullest extent possible’ including the prevention and the suppression of piracy and robbery 
against ships and in accordance with the contracting parties’ respective national laws and 
regulations and subject to their available resources or capabilities. 
 
 The cooperation among the contracting parties forms the centrepiece of the 
agreement and can be divided into three different areas of cooperation. 
 
 The first and probably most important area of cooperation is information sharing 
between the contracting parties. ReCAAP has established an Information Sharing Centre 
(ISC) which is a permanent body with full time staff, located in Singapore and funded by 
the member states. The ISC consists of the Governing Council, being the decision-making 
body composed of one representative from each contracting party, and the Secretariat, 
headed by the Executive Director. The Governing Council makes policies concerning all 
matters of the ISC whereas the Executive Director is responsible for the administrative, 
operational and financial matters of the ISC in accordance with the policies as determined 
by the Governing Council and the provisions of the agreement.223 The daily operation of 
the ISC is undertaken by the Secretariat.224 
 The functions carried out by the ISC are provided in Article 7 ReCAAP. The most 
noteworthy functions are (a) to manage and maintain the expeditious flow of information 
relating to incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships among the contracting 
parties, (b) to collect, collate and analyse the information transmitted by the contracting 
                                                           
223 Article 4 ReCAAP. 
224 Article 8 ReCAAP. 
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parties, (c) to prepare statistics and reports and (d) to provide an appropriate alert, 
whenever possible, to the contracting parties if there is reasonable ground to believe that a 
threat of incidents of piracy or armed robbery against a ship is imminent. The ISC states 
that its operating principles are respect for sovereignty, effectiveness and transparency.225 
 
 In practice, information sharing means that each contracting party designates a so-
called focal point responsible for its communication with the ISC and pledges to ensure the 
smooth and effective communication between its designated focal point and other 
competent national authorities, including rescue coordination centres as well as relevant 
non-governmental organisations. Moreover, every contracting party is obliged to make 
every effort to require its ships, shipowners or shipoperators to promptly notify relevant 
national authorities including focal points and the ISC, when appropriate, in case of 
incidents of piracy or armed robbery against ships. But also each contracting party is 
required to promptly give relevant information to the ISC through its designated focal 
point if it has received or obtained information about an imminent threat of or an incident 
of piracy or armed robbery against ships. Likewise, in the event that a contracting party 
receives an alert from the ISC about an imminent threat of piracy or armed robbery against 
ships the contracting party has the obligation to promptly disseminate the alert to ships 
within the area of such an imminent threat.226 
 ReCAAP has also designed a mechanism for information exchange between 
contracting parties. Every contracting party may request any other contracting party 
through the ISC or directly to cooperate in detecting pirates, other persons who have 
committed armed robbery against ships and victims of an offence as well as ships used for 
an offence and victim ships.227 The contracting party receiving such a request has to make 
every effort to take effective and practical measures for implementing the request.228 
 
 The second area of cooperation consists in taking legal and judicial measures to 
prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships. ReCAAP stipulates that a 
contracting party is required to try to extradite pirates or persons who have committed 
armed robbery against ships and who are present in its territory to the other contracting 
party which has jurisdiction over them at the request of the latter. Furthermore, all 
contracting parties are obliged to make an effort to render mutual legal assistance to one 
                                                           
225 See http://www.recaap.org/index_home.html [17.02.2010]. 
226 Article 9 ReCAAP. 
227 Article 10 ReCAAP. 
228 Article 11 ReCAAP. 
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another with regard to criminal matters including the submission of evidence related to 
piracy and armed robbery against ships. All efforts of the contracting parties are subject to 
their national laws and regulations.229 
 
 The third area of cooperation is related to the process of capacity building 
supported by the ISC. Such capacity building cooperation may include technical assistance 
as for instance educational and training programmes to share one another’s experiences 
and best practices. In order to improve the capacity of all contracting parties to prevent and 
suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships, each contracting party is bound by 
ReCAAP to endeavour ‘to cooperate to the fullest possible extent with other contracting 
parties’.230 The agreement also encourages the contracting parties to make cooperative 
arrangements such as joint exercises or other forms of cooperation among one another.231 
 
(iii) Limits and Remaining Challenges of ReCAAP 
Beyond any doubt ReCAAP and the established ISC can be regarded as a successful 
attempt to prevent and suppress piracy on a regional level. As the decrease of piratical 
attacks in Southeast Asia in recent years clearly demonstrates, regional cooperation in 
terms of ReCAAP basically has the potential to contribute considerably to the 
improvement of situations in piracy-infested areas.232 
 
 However, it has to be born in mind that also ReCAAP is still limited in its scope 
and could be enhanced to combat piracy in the region of Southeast Asia in an even better 
way if remaining deficiencies were eliminated. 
 
 Firstly, in some respect ReCAAP reveals very similar shortcomings to the 
UNCLOS piracy provisions. Due to the adoption of the UNCLOS definition of piracy, 
which ultimately was merely extended to piratical acts occurring within each contracting 
parties’ jurisdiction, the same problems remain as under UNCLOS, such as the two ship 
requirement and the private ends requirement. Moreover, just like Article 100 UNCLOS 
which does not clarify which level of cooperation between the signatory states is required, 
                                                           
229 Article 12 and 13 ReCAAP. 
230 Article 14 ReCAAP. 
231 Article 15 ReCAAP. 
232 Apparently, the efforts made have proved sufficiently successful to cause Lloyd’s to drop the Strait of 
Malacca from its high-risk list as of August 2006, see J Gardner ‘Strait of Malacca off High-risk List; Ship 
Premiums Likely to Decline’ (14.08.2006) Business Insurance, available at 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-149566041.html [Accessed 17.02.2010]. 
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ReCAAP does not determine more precisely to which extent the contracting parties are 
obliged to render assistance to one another, either.233 
 
 Secondly, ReCAAP is also criticised for dealing insufficiently with the practical 
aspects of anti-piracy measures. Apart from information sharing between contracting 
parties, cooperation with regard to patrolling and apprehending offenders is still very 
restricted. Article 2(5) ReCAAP expressly states that contracting parties are not entitled to 
enter into the territorial waters of a neighbouring state which is also a party to the 
agreement. Consequently, hot pursuits of offenders into the territorial waters of another 
contracting party are only permitted if express consent is given.234 Besides, it is worth 
mentioning that so far only coordinated but no joint maritime patrols of various contracting 
parties take place.235 
 In essence, the reluctant cooperation among the contracting parties and accordingly 
ReCAAP’s restrictive provisions are based on the fact that most Southeast Asian countries 
with a recent colonial history ‘generally guard their territorial and political sovereignty 
with extreme jealousy’.236 Additionally, several still not yet completely unchallenged 
maritime boundaries and the current political climate may underpin their reluctance and 
hamper closer cooperation.237 
 
 Thirdly, ReCAAP’s effectiveness is substantially dependent on the number of states 
which accede to the agreement and ultimately ratify it. 
 Thus, on the one hand, it is very unfortunate that two major states bordering the 
Strait of Malacca, namely Indonesia and Malaysia, have not yet ratified the agreement.238 
Once again, the main reason for the non-ratification can be seen in issues of sovereignty. 
 On the other hand, it is argued that the success of ReCAAP is limited by its 
deliberate exclusion of states such as Australia and New Zealand which otherwise could 
contribute ‘significant resources, both by way of information resources, and ships or 
aircraft for patrolling’.239 
 
                                                           
233 Collins & Hassan (note 43) at 111. 
234 Cf. Guilfoyle (note 82) at 698-9. 
235 Bahar (note 5) at 78. 
236 Barrios (note 42) at159-60. 
237 Cf. Young & Valencia (note 136) at 277. 
238 Keyuan (note 81) at 333; unfortunately the ReCAAP website does not give information on the current 
status of ratifications. 
239 Collins & Hassan (note 43) at 112. 
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(b) Replicating ReCAAP in the Region off the Coast of Somalia 
Basically acknowledging ReCAAP’s success in Southeast Asia, the question of whether 
and in how far the agreement can serve as a model of law for other regional legal 
arrangements, such as in the hot spot of piracy off the coast of Somalia naturally arises.240 
 
(i) The Djibouti Code of Conduct 
In recent years several regional meetings on combating and preventing piracy inspired by 
ReCAAP and frequently convened by the IMO took place. Accordingly, a conference held 
in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in April 2008 produced a draft regional memorandum of 
understanding on the subject of piracy off the Somali coast. This draft formed the basis of 
the Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (the Code of Conduct) which was 
adopted by 17 states from the Western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and Red Sea areas on 
the last high-level meeting in Djibouti in January 2009 (Djibouti Meeting).241 The meeting 
was also attended by observers from other IMO member states, United Nations specialised 
agencies and bodies, international and regional inter-governmental organisations (e.g. the 
ReCAAP ISC), non-governmental organisations and the maritime industry to provide 
financial and in-kind support for technical assistance activities related to the effective 
implementation of the Code of Conduct.242 
 
 In the Code of Conduct the signatory states recognise the extent of the problem of 
piracy and armed robbery against ships in the region and declare their intention to 
cooperate to the fullest possible extent and in a manner consistent with international law in 
the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships.243  
 The Code of Conduct is designed to facilitate sharing and reporting relevant 
information through a system of national focal points and piracy information exchange 
centres which are to be located in Kenya, Tanzania and Yemen. Further purposes of the 
Code of Conduct are to interdict ships suspected of engaging in an act of piracy or armed 
                                                           
240 Cf. Keyuan (note 81) at 336. 
241 The 17 states which participated are Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Jordan, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Maldives, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania and 
Yemen. 
242 Detailed information on the Djibouti Meeting is available at 
http://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1773&doc_id=10933 [Accessed 19.02.2010]. 
243 It is to be noted that during the closing ceremony in Djibouti the Code of Conduct was only signed by 
nine states, namely Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania and 
Yemen, although the Code of Conduct is open for signature by the 21 countries in the region. Nonetheless, 
the Code of Conduct is effective as from 29 January 2009. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
LL.M. THESIS – THORSTE RESCH (UIVERSITY OF CAPE TOW) 
 61
robbery against ships and to ensure that persons committing or attempting to commit acts 
of piracy or armed robbery against ships are apprehended and prosecuted.244 
 
 The signatory states also intend to fully cooperate in the arrest, investigation and 
prosecution of persons who have committed piracy or are reasonably suspected of having 
committed piracy. Additionally, they state their intention to review their respective 
national legislations with a view towards ensuring that there are laws in place to 
criminalise piracy and armed robbery against ships and adequate guidelines for the 
exercise of jurisdiction, conduct of investigation and prosecution of alleged offenders.245 
 
(ii) Difficulties of Replicating ReCAAP 
Altogether the Code of Conduct bears resemblance to ReCAAP in many respects. Partially 
the Code of Conduct goes even further than ReCAAP as it also provides regional 
cooperation through the use of shipriders, which are placed as designated law enforcement 
officials from one signatory state on board the patrol ship of another signatory state.246 
Moreover, the signatory states already agreed on establishing a regional training centre 
within the purposes of the Code of Conduct.247 
 
 The fundamental difference, however, consists in the circumstance that contrary to 
ReCAAP the Code of Conduct is only a non-binding instrument which only reflects the 
signatory states’ intentions with regard to combating piracy off the coast of Somalia.248 
Therefore, despite the Code of Conduct’s potential to serve as a useful tool to combat 
piracy its effectiveness will remain very limited unless all signatory states agree on 
concluding a binding agreement on that subject.249 
 
 In order to establish an efficient system of cooperation off the coast of Somalia 
based on a binding agreement with mutual legal obligations, it could be helpful to involve 
                                                           
244 See Article 2 of the Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden; the full text was adopted by Resolution 1 of the 
Djibouti Meeting and is available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf9/piracy-djibouti-meeting 
[Accessed 19.02.2010]. 
245 Article 4 and 11 of the Code of Conduct. 
246 Article 7 of the Code of Conduct. 
247 See Resolution 3 of the Djibouti Meeting adopted on 29 January 2009 ‘Enhancing Training in the 
Region’, available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf9/piracy-djibouti-meeting [Accessed 
19.02.2010]. 
248 Cf. Article 15 of the Code of Conduct which clearly states that ‘[n]othing in this Code of Conduct is 
intended to create of establish a binding agreement’. 
249 As stated in Resolution 1 the Djibouti Meeting has at least the ‘aim of arriving at a binding agreement’. 
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states which have larger navies and generally more facilities to combat piracy to a greater 
extent. This means that wealthier states could take over leadership, such as Egypt and 
South Africa.250 In view of the fact that most other African countries simply lack capacities 
needed for efficient anti-piracy cooperation, particularly these two countries would also act 
in their own interest. Egypt is heavily dependent on vessels transiting the Suez Canal 
which regularly also have to pass through the narrow strait between the Horn of Africa and 
the Arabian peninsula whereas in South Africa it should be noted that the danger of piracy 
is moving south the African east coast.251 
 Without a common political will of all African countries concerned to address the 
problem of piracy every form of cooperation will only produce very moderate success. In 
perspective, also closer cooperation under the umbrella of the African Union (AU) appears 
to be a useful option to finally obtain results in combating piracy similar to those achieved 
by ReCAAP in Southeast Asia. 
 
(c) Complementing Regional Cooperation: Establishing Regional Piracy Courts 
The establishment of specialised piracy courts provides another possibility to cope with the 
issue of inconsistent prosecution of apprehended offenders. The question arises which form 
of a specialised court or tribunal may fit best to ensure effectiveness, particularly 
considering piracy off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden. The two traditional 
international law enforcement mechanisms are either supranational tribunals, such as the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), or the domestication of international law in national 
courts, for instance through universal jurisdiction.252 Alternatively, regional piracy courts 
could be established. 
 
 It is argued that especially the ICC should be invited to play a decisive role in the 
fight against piracy.253 The ICC is an independent, permanent court which tries persons 
accused of the most serious crimes of international concern, namely genocides, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. It was established in 1998 when 120 states adopted the 
                                                           
250 With regard to South Africa’s potential leadership role see Fouché (note 155) at 11. 
251 Corresponding remarks have been made by Colonel J Waweru in his speech (‘Realising the Threatening 
Danger as the Phenomenon is Moving South’) at the Combating and Preventing Sea Piracy in Africa Summit 
2009, Cape Town, 26 - 28 August 2009. 
252 Bahar (note 5) at 81-2. 
253 Keyuan (note 81) at 344; also stating that, during the deliberations of the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1851 in December 2008, several countries such like Egypt or Denmark raised the issue of 
bringing pirates to international justice.  
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Rome Statute which entered into force on 1 July 2002 after ratification by 60 countries.254 
However, in order to involve the ICC in the prosecution of piracy first of all the scope of 
the ICC’s jurisdiction is to be extended to the crime of piracy. At present, however, the 
establishment of an international piracy tribunal even under the auspices of the ICC 
appears to be very difficult because several states are not willing to give up their right to 
prosecute pirates who attack their interests and additionally there is the question of where 
such pirates would be imprisoned.255 
 
 As regards the domestication of international law in national courts through 
universal jurisdiction, in recent times Somali pirates have only very rarely been transferred 
to non-African jurisdictions but rather were sent to Kenya to grant a fair trial, although 
Kenya’s resources and facilities are already nearly exhausted.256 
 
 Another approach consists in the establishment of regional piracy courts which 
could complement initiatives of regional cooperation to combat piracy, such as ReCAAP 
in Southeast Asia or the Djibouti Code of Conduct in the Western Indian Ocean and the 
Gulf of Aden. Regional adjudication through regional piracy courts can be an alternative to 
the above-mentioned traditional international law enforcement mechanisms, combining 
their advantages and minimising their disadvantages to form an ‘ideal compromise’.257 
 
 Concerning piracy off the coast of Somalia, a regional piracy court, maybe located 
in Kenya, could be established through resolutions of the AU or through multilateral 
treaties, potentially also including affected Arabian states such as Yemen or Saudi Arabia. 
This court would benefit from the following circumstances. 
 
 Firstly, such a regional piracy court could draw on the legal experience of the 
region and ensure that judges and other lawyers have enough knowledge and skills in 
international and maritime law. But also in financial matters the court could pool resources 
from the whole region and additionally may receive financial support from the 
international community which also has an interest in resolving the problem of piracy in 
                                                           
254 More information on the ICC is available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ 
[Accessed 24.02.2010]. 
255 Askins (note 56) at 6. 
256 Ibid. 
257 W Burke-White ‘Regionalization of International Criminal Law Enforcement: A Preliminary Inquiry’ 
(2003) 38 Tex. Int’l L. J. 729 at 734 
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the region due to the significance of international maritime trade.258 
 
 Secondly, with regard to the specific nature of law enforcement on the high seas, a 
regional piracy court could promote the development of the utilisation of ‘the most 
efficient and fair rules of evidence and procedure’.259 
 
 Thirdly, the establishment of a regional piracy court would strengthen the 
effectiveness and attractiveness of the rule of law in the region while largely avoiding that 
the enforcement of the rule of law could be regarded as an imposition initiated by western 
countries.260 
 
 Fourthly, joint regional adjudication would contribute to reduce jurisdictional 
conflicts among states. It would also allow states to ‘either share the glory of prosecution, 
or distance themselves as appropriate’, in particular if prosecutions relate to more 
politically motivated defendants.261 
 
 Consequently, regional adjudication through regional piracy courts appears to be 
the most realistic and useful instrument to ensure consistent prosecution of apprehended 
offenders, complementing other efforts of regional cooperation. 
 
                                                           
258 Bahar (note 5) at 82. 
259 Ibid. 
260 Ibid at 83. 
261 Ibid at 83-4. 
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CHAPTER 5: Self-defence, Armed Guards and Armed Escort Vessels 
 
Despite several efforts made so far to reduce the number of incidents, piratical attacks still 
occur frequently, especially in hot spots like off the coast of Somalia. Due to the vast areas 
affected by piracy comprehensive protection against piratical attacks appears to be 
impossible. Thus, the question arises whether and in how far self-defence or the 
privatisation of anti-piracy efforts, i.e. the employment of armed guards or armed escort 
vessels, can serve as useful alternative measures to prevent, for instance, hostage-takings 
off the Somali coast. 
 
I. Self-defence on Board 
Given the fact that captains and crews may often not be willing to hand over their vessels 
to the attacking pirates without any resistance, the recourse to self-defence seems to be 
easily comprehensible. However, the extent to which crew members should exercise self-
defence is vague, particularly the use of lethal measures. 
 
 As regards self-defence using non-lethal measures, private security companies are 
providing various forms of protection for merchant vessels transiting piracy-infested areas. 
There is a range of tactics and non-lethal technologies to ward off piratical attacks.262 
Possible means of defence are for instance water guns as well as so-called long range 
acoustic devices which beam ear-splitting alarm tones and have proved to be a useful 
weapon to prevent pirates from boarding the vessel.263 Also the installation of electric 
fences or razor wire surrounding the vessel can contribute to hamper the boarding by 
pirates.264 
 The use of such non-lethal measures is also recognised by the IMO because these 
means of defence may serve as appropriate preventive measures to deter attackers and 
delay boarding.265 
 
                                                           
262 Kraska & Wilson (note 34) at 47. 
263 See J Straziuso ‘Mærsk Alabama Attacked Again by Pirates’ (19.11.2009) 4avy Times, available at 
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2009/11/ap_navy_maersk_piracy_111809w/ [Accessed 20.02.2010]. 
264 Kraska & Wilson (note 34) at 48; describing more detailed that a Dutch company has developed a 9,000 
volt electric fence, but that it may not be an appropriate solution for ships with flammable cargo, such as oil 
tankers. 
265 See IMO ‘Guidance to Shipowners and Ship Operators, Shipmasters and Crews on Preventing and 
Suppressing Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships’ MSC.1/Circ.1334 (23.06.2009) [hereinafter 
IMO Guidance to Shipowners] (note 215) at paragraph 56-8; also noting that in particular water guns are 
only to be used if the master is convinced that the usage is to the advantage of and without risk to crew 
members on board. 
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 The use of lethal firearms, however, is much more problematic. Firstly, it has to be 
born in mind that vessels, which carry firearms on board and enter the territorial waters or 
ports of another state, are subject to that state’s legislation. Accordingly, the importation of 
firearms is subject to port and coastal state regulations.266 
 Secondly, the use of firearms carries the risk that an already dangerous situation 
may escalate as the resistance with firearms may encourage pirates to conduct their attacks 
even more ruthlessly. Against the backdrop that seafarers are civilians, the effective use of 
firearms also requires special training and aptitudes in order to preclude or at least 
minimise the risk of accidents with firearms on board.267 
 Thirdly, depending on the respective state’s jurisdiction shootings with attackers, 
which may result in life-threatening injuries or even death of a national, may have 
unforeseen consequences and impose a legal risk even for crew members who believe to 
have acted in self-defence.268 
 
 For these legal and safety reasons, the IMO strongly discourages seafarers from 
carrying and using firearms on board for personal protection or for the protection of a 
vessel. 269 
 
II. Privatisation of Anti-piracy Efforts 
The more controversial issue, also with regard to contemporary international law, is the 
privatisation of anti-piracy efforts, that is to say either the employment of private armed 
guards on board merchant vessels or alternatively the commission of private armed escort 
vessels. 
 
 It is argued that so far policy-makers have only insufficiently taken the arming of 
merchant vessels into account, being the quickest and lowest-cost means of deterring 
piracy, in favour of the slowest and high-cost options of promoting action through 
international organisations and using naval forces which cannot resolve the costly problem 
alone and are generally designed for other purposes.270 
 
                                                           
266 Ibid at paragraph 59. 
267 Ibid at paragraph 60. 
268 Ibid at paragraph 61. 
269 Ibid at paragraph 60; a dissenting opinion following a more offensive approach of self-defence is to be 
found at Stiles (note 13) 313-16. 
270 D Staub ‘Letters of Marque: A Short-term Solution to an Age Old Problem’ (2009) 40 J. Mar. L. & Com. 
261 at 264 and 269. 
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 At first glance the approach of arming merchant vessels may appear to be a helpful 
and potentially effective short-term solution to the problem of piracy. However, there are 
several practical and legal concerns which have to be pointed out. 
 
1. The General Risk of Exacerbating the Already Dangerous Situation 
First of all, there is the fear that the readiness of merchant vessels to engage in military 
confrontation with pirates will exacerbate the severity of piratical attacks.271 More 
generally, if force is met with force the violence at sea may be even greater.272 In view of 
the fact that so far pirates generally do not intend to harm the crew, it is unsure how they 
would react if a gang members were killed during a hijack.273 
 
 In addition, the danger of setting the cargo and maybe the whole ship on fire, 
particular in the case of oil tankers or vessels transporting similarly hazardous cargos, 
should not be underestimated.274 
 
 Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that opinions on that matter differ considerably. 
While an overwhelming number of shipowners in the United Kingdom is against the idea 
of armed guards on board merchant vessels, the ‘Spanish government gave approval for 
weapons to be deployed on its fishing fleet ... after three attacks [by Somali pirates] on 
Spanish trawlers in early September [2009]’ had occurred.275 
 
 The use of unarmed security personnel, however, is generally accepted. Such teams 
can give training and support to the crew with the result that crew members are able and 
confident to avoid or repel piratical attacks by non-lethal means.276 
 
2. Problems under International Law 
Both private armed guards on board merchant vessels and private armed escort vessels 
cause problems under international law. 
 
                                                           
271 Mo (note 25) at 354. 
272 See Shearer (note 98) at 29. 
273 See S Askins’ remarks at the INCE & Co website http://www.incelaw.com/ourpeople/Stephen-
Askins/introduction_piracy [Accessed 14.08.2009]. 
274 Cf. Kraska & Wilson (note 34) at 47. 
275 Askins (note 56) at 7. 
276 See IMO Guidance to Shipowners (note 215) at paragraph 62. 
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(a) Armed Guards on Board Merchant Vessels 
Concerning armed guards on board merchant vessels, it has to be distinguished between 
vessels navigating on the high seas on the one hand and vessels transiting territorial waters 
of other countries on the other hand.277 According to Article 92 UNCLOS vessels on the 
high seas are only subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state. Thus, the flag state 
can permit or deny the carriage of arms as well as private armed guards on board. 
 The situation alters if an armed merchant vessel enters into the territorial waters of 
another coastal state and consequently falls under the jurisdiction of that particular state. 
The coastal state concerned may view such an incident as a violation of its territorial 
sovereignty and may for instance detain such a vessel if found within its territorial 
waters.278 
 
 Moreover, subject to the contract between the shipowner and the private security 
company of the armed guards, the master may no longer have control or the final decision 
in whether weapons will be deployed and used. Article 34(1) SOLAS provides though: 
 
The owner, charterer, the company operating the ship as defined in 
Regulation 1X/1 or any other person shall not prevent or restrict the master of the 
ship from taking or executing any decision which, in the master’s professional 
judgement is necessary for the safety of life at sea and protection of the marine 
environment. 
 
 Hence, making the master give up his discretion in favour of the private armed 
guards could constitute a violation of the SOLAS provision.279 
 
 Another issue respecting armed guards on board merchant vessels consists in the 
uncertainty how private security companies would be held accountable in case of excessive 
use of force.280 
                                                           
277 Correspondingly, situations in various piracy-infested areas can differ considerably as for example 
piratical attacks in the Strait of Malacca predominantly take place in the territorial waters of littoral states 
whereas a large number of incidents off the Somali coast occurs on the high seas. 
278 Kraska & Wilson (note 34) at 47 referring to Malaysia’s Internal Security Director, Othman Talib. 
279 INCE & Co ‘Issues Arising from the Use of Armed Guards’ (September 2009) at 2-3, available at 
http://www.incelaw.com/documents/pdf/Strands/Shipping/Article/Piracy-issues-arising-from-the-use-of-
armed-guards [Accessed 21.02.2010]; also stating that the content of the SOLAS provision was reinforced in 
the ISPS Code which provides: ‘At all times the master of a ship has the ultimate responsibility for the safety 
and security of the ship…’. 
280 Kraska & Wilson (note 34) at 47. 
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(b) Private Armed Escort Vessels 
The employment of private armed escort vessels also causes problems under international 
law. Again, it has to be distinguished between the high seas and the territorial waters of a 
state. 
 
 Article 107 UNCLOS provides that on the high seas the right to seize pirate vessels 
is reserved for warships or other ships which are clearly marked and identifiable as being 
on government service and authorised to that effect. Consequently, states are obliged to 
formally commission private armed escort vessels to engage in anti-piracy actions on the 
high seas as otherwise questions arise whether the armed intervention of a private escort 
vessel in itself constitutes an act of piracy in terms of Article 101 UNCLOS.281 In any case, 
subject to Article 106 UNCLOS if a commissioned private armed escort vessel makes a 
seizure of another vessel without adequate grounds the state of the seizing vessels is held 
liable. 
 
 The situation within territorial waters is as follows: Article 2 UNCLOS stipulates 
that the sovereignty of a state extends to its territorial waters. Thus, a state is entitled to 
authorise private armed escort vessels to seize pirate vessels within its own territorial 
waters. 
 The scenario is more difficult if an armed escort vessel enters into the territorial 
waters of another state. In general, subject to Article 17 UNCLOS vessels of all states 
enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial waters of other states. Due to 
Article 19(2)(b) UNCLOS the right of innocent passage is limited though: 
 
Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered prejudicial to the peace, good order 
or security of the coastal state if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the 
following activities: 
... any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind. 
 
 Hence, the armed escort of merchant vessels through territorial waters of other 
states would violate Article 19(2)(b) UNCLOS.282 
 
                                                           
281 Cf. Stiles (note 13) at 317. 
282 Therefore, ibid at 319-20 offers an amendment to Article 19 UNCLOS on innocent passage to include a 
provision such as: ‘the right of innocent passage is not lost when a ship defends itself or another ship against 
attacks from hostile ships not in the service of the state, provided the defence is reasonable’. 
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 Apart from these legal issues, in practice it is very likely that many of the relevant 
coastal states in piracy-infested areas would be very reluctant to permit such practices 
because private armed escort vessels entering into the territorial waters of a state would be 
regarded as ‘a serious threat to the national security and sovereignty of that state’.283 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
283 Mo (note 25) at 351. 
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CHAPTER 6: Conclusion 
 
Piracy remains a serious threat to international maritime trade and deserves corresponding 
attention of all stakeholders and policy-makers involved in order to avert further damage. 
The situation in hot spots of piracy such as off the coast of Somalia is difficult but not 
hopeless if the international community manages collectively to take the decisive anti-
piracy measures on an international or regional level.  
 
 Whenever the effectiveness of current international conventions on piracy is 
debated, the prevailing view expressed is that the major international conventions on 
piracy, namely UNCLOS and the SUA Convention, lack the capacity to successfully 
combat piracy. However, this point of view is only correct to a certain extent. 
 
 As regards piratical attacks on the high seas the piracy regime of UNCLOS 
generally serves as a useful tool to combat piracy. Limitations due to the private ends 
requirement as well as the two ship requirement should not be overestimated, rather they 
can assist in differentiating between piratical attacks and acts of maritime terrorism. By 
contrast, a more serious deficiency of UNCLOS consists in the limited right of hot pursuit 
excluding pursuits commenced on the high seas and continuing into the territorial waters of 
a coastal state. Likewise, the international cooperation is ultimately a matter of discretion 
of every signatory state as no international enforcement agency has been established under 
UNCLOS. Thus, lacking an adequate organisational structure to deal with piracy, 
UNCLOS is limited in its effectiveness. 
 
 The SUA Convention can act as an additional instrument, particularly to fill in the 
gaps of UNCLOS in respect of piratical attacks occurring in the territorial waters of coastal 
states. Besides the controversial issue of how to define the offences, the vital problem is 
that anti-piracy measures subject to the SUA Convention can only be taken effectively if 
all states affected are parties to the convention. Due to more stringent provisions with 
regard to international cooperation among the signatory states, many states are rather 
reluctant to ratify the SUA Convention. But even if all affected states became signatories, 
the SUA Convention would still reveal deficiencies similar to UNCLOS because 
prosecution and extradition of offenders are still subject to the respective apprehending 
state’s discretion and no enforcement or sanction mechanism exists. Hence, the 
convention’s basic idea to eliminate safe havens for offenders dilutes significantly. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
LL.M. THESIS – THORSTE RESCH (UIVERSITY OF CAPE TOW) 
 72
 Despite these undeniable limitations, both under UNCLOS and the SUA 
Convention, it has to be born in mind that these major conventions would basically provide 
sufficient means to suppress the majority of types of piracy if all signatory states acted in 
accordance with the conventions’ provisions to the highest possible extent. Especially 
regarding the SUA Convention it is left to every single state interested in combating piracy 
to ratify the convention and comply with its provisions. 
 Moreover, several recommendations have already been made to enhance the 
existing international legal framework against piracy. In particular the Draft Guidelines for 
National Legislation could provide support on issues of jurisdiction and prosecution and 
contribute to a reduction of the inconsistency in national laws concerning acts of piracy 
and maritime violence. Additionally, regional cooperation as under ReCAAP 
complemented by regional adjudication can form a strong foundation for further collective 
acts within piracy-infested regions. In view of the fact that a significantly smaller number 
of states is involved, achieving progress on a regional level is arguably far easier than a 
revision of the piracy provisions of UNCLOS, for instance, which does not seem to be 
realistic anytime soon. 
 
 However, in any case, ultimately all forms of cooperation and the implementation 
of already existing and future international conventions on piracy are heavily dependent on 
two key aspects, namely the political will in principle to combat piracy regardless of who 
the suspected offenders are as well as the willingness of coastal states to cede sovereignty 
over their territorial waters at least to some extent in order to facilitate more effective 
cooperation among states. An expansion of the right of hot pursuits into other coastal 
states’ territorial waters, for example, appears to be inevitable to eliminate safe havens for 
pirates. It is insufficient and unhelpful to only controversially debate about more 
encompassing definitions of piracy. 
 
 In absence of a comprehensive response of the international community to the 
persistent piratical attacks shipowners, masters and crews are increasingly likely to turn to 
do-it-yourself solutions, such as arming merchant vessels, engaging private armed guards 
on board or employing private armed escort vessels. The aftermath of such pragmatic anti-
piracy measures cannot be foreseen, at the worst the already dangerous situation at sea may 
escalate. 
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 The specific situation off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden requires 
utmost efforts to cope with the problem of piracy. Although the situation has considerably 
improved due to the presence of international naval forces in the region subject to the 
United Nations Security Council resolutions bridging the existing gaps of UNCLOS and 
the SUA Convention, the attacks of Somali pirates are continuing with serious concerns.  
 
 It is to be realised, however, that currently only the symptoms of the failed state of 
Somalia are combated. Admittedly, the conclusion of a binding regional cooperation 
agreement on combating piracy and the establishment of a regional piracy court are worth 
aiming at. Nonetheless, it is highly doubtful that Somali pirates will stop their frequent 
attacks against merchant vessels, until Somalia can be stabilised and is again properly 
governed. As Mejia correctly states: 
 
The international maritime community knows full well from the decades of dealing 
with the problems of piracy, armed robbery against ships, terrorism, and other 
maritime crimes that the most lasting solutions lie not at sea, but on land.
284 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
284 Mejia (note 161) at 46. 
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